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THE DAO OF PRIVACY
by
LARA A. BALLARD*
1. INTRODUCTION
In her 2012 book Configuring the Networked Self, Julie Cohen examines the 
“rhetoric of liberty” underlying debates about privacy rights (as well as in-
tellectual property), and concludes that there are “deep inadequacies in the 
conventional ways of thinking about information rights and architectures.”1 
Privacy is a concept that consistently eludes definition, reliant as it is upon 
the vagaries of  human psychology and assumptions about the nature of 
selfhood and its relationship with the outside world. As Cohen points out, 
however, legal analysis of privacy tends to reduce the issue either to eco-
nomic analysis or a normative theory of rights. Cohen asserts this tendency 
is deeply rooted, to its detriment, in “the ideological commitments of liberal 
political theory,” which in turn has its origins in “a tradition of Enlighten-
ment rationalism extending from Kant to Weber to Habermas and Rawls.”2 
This tradition, she says, makes several assumptions about the nature of the 
self as a legal subject; namely, that:
(1) the legal subject is a “definitionally autonomous being, possessed of 
abstract liberty rights that are presumed capable of exercise regard-
less of the context”;
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1 Julie Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self 4 (2012).  
2 Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, 16.  
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(2) the  legal  subject  possesses  a  “capacity  for  rational  deliberation” 
which is also “detached from the context”;
(3) the selfhood possessed by the legal subject is transcendent, imma-
terial,  and  “distinct  from  the  body  in  which  the  legal  subject 
resides.”  In other words, “the liberal self has a body, but is not un-
derstood as being a body.”3  
These assumptions, in turn, lead to “abstract, quasi-scientific models of 
legal
reasoning” that formulate privacy rights in ways that are “always too 
broad or too narrow.”4  Privacy rights are often reduced to property in-
terests, or worse yet, subordinated to property interests or to other rights 
such as freedom of expression.  
As an antidote to these conventional ways of thinking, Cohen advocates 
for an embrace of postmodernist thought.  Postmodernism is often defined 
as "a late 20th century style and concept... which... has at its heart a general 
distrust of grand theories and ideologies..."5 and Cohen’s book uses it  to 
portray a more realistic model of the self as it develops through its interac-
tions with the outside world.  Cohen highlights the scholarship of Michel 
Foucault,  Gilles Deleuze and Hans-Georg Gadamer as more adept at ex-
pressing the fluid nature by which selfhood develops through interaction or 
“play” with the surrounding culture.  Such notions of self-development are 
in direct contradiction with the classic Western liberal concept of the self as 
an “autonomous,  solitary,  disembodied individual”  who needs seclusion 
from culture in order to become fully realized.  
Cohen singles out for particular praise the work of social psychologist Ir-
win Altman, who conceptualizes privacy as a dynamic process of interper-
sonal boundary regulation in which openness and closedness are of equal 
value, one that regulates not only the development of intimate relationships, 
but one’s evolving sense of identity.6  In general, Cohen advocates for the 
abandonment of the “Western, liberal model of solitary subjectivity” in fa-
vor of “socially-situated models of the self,” and of abstract rights theories 
3 Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, 16.    
4 Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self, 18.   
5 Oxford English Reference Dictionary (2nd Ed. 1996), at 1132
6 See Irwin Altman and Martin Chemers, Culture and Environment 77-79 (1980).  Altman’s 
work is discussed by Cohen at 131, 143, and 146. 
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in  favor  of  context-specific  analysis.   Cohen’s  groundbreaking  work  has 
opened many new doors for scholarly inquiry, and my humble goal with 
this article is to take a few initial steps through but one of them. 
Cohen’s throwing down of the gauntlet before the Western liberal tradi-
tion is  an open invitation to a non-Western critique of privacy, although, 
with the notable exception of Amartya Sen, Cohen herself does not cite to 
virtually any non-Western scholarship. She is far from alone in this regard. 
Of the major  privacy theorists  currently publishing in  the  United States, 
few, if any, have ever analyzed, referred to, or even mentioned any works of  
philosophy, literature, political science, or art of non-Western origin.7 
To the extent such scholarship reflects underlying assumptions that East 
Asia has no tradition of privacy, or for that matter, individualism, such per-
ceptions are quite easily refuted. In 2008, Japanese blogger Osamu Higuchi 
posted a now widely-circulated open letter to Google, in which he articu-
lated  his  objections  to  Google  Street  View  using  standards  of  Japanese 
etiquette that he claimed dated back to the 11th century.8  Neo-Confucian 
7 Those hardy few who venture outside the cozy confines of the Anglo-American tradition 
seem to become quickly ensconced in the intellectual history of Continental Europe.   See,  
e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: the Destruction of Privacy in America 214 (2000)(re-
ferring to Foucault’s discussion of Bentham’s Panopticon). Daniel Solove, in The Digital Per-
son, explains the importance of finding a proper literary metaphor to conceptualize privacy 
in the digital age, declares inadequate the current metaphors derived from the works of 
British author George Orwell—and then immediately turns to the works of Austrian/Czech 
author Franz Kafka for fresh inspiration. Daniel Solove, The Digital Person PAGE (2004).  In 
fairness to Solove, however, I should note that he provided a very insightful analysis of the 
“Korean dog poop girl.”  See Daniel Solove, Of Privacy and Poop: Norm Enforcement Via 
the Blogosphere, June 30, 2005, available online at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/06/of-pri-
vacy-and-poop-norm-enforcement.html. Jeffrey Rosen, in The Unwanted Gaze, pauses only 
briefly at the Jewish legal tradition of hezzek re’iyyah, on his way to the fictional works of 
Milan Kundera.  Jeffery Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze:  The Destruction of Privacy in America 
18 (2000).  Hezzek re’iyyah means “the injury caused by seeing” or “the injury caused by 
being seen.”  Id. Even Amitai Etzioni, who grounds his definition of privacy in a system of  
thought he calls “new communitarianism,” mentions contemporary Asian communitarians 
only in passing. See Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy 198 (1999), citing Bilahari Kausik-
an, “Asian versus ‘Universal’ Human Rights,” The Responsive Community 7 (1997): 9-21.  
8 Osamu Higuchi, “Letter to the People at Google,” August 7, 2008; English translation at  
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/08/08/japan-letter-to-google-about-street-view/.   Osamu 
asserted that the part of a Japanese property that typically faces a public road is, unlike an 
American-style front yard, considered a more intimate part of one’s living space, and that 
the act of “peeping” into such a space, referred to in Japanese as kaimami (stealing a peek), 
has been considered rude since “back in the days of the ‘Tale of Genji.’”  The Tale of Genji, 
sometimes characterized as “the world’s first novel,” is attributed to 11 th century Japanese 
noblewoman  Murasaki  Shikibu.   Osamu’s  conceptualization  of  privacy  as  a  form  of 
“etiquette” comports with Altman’s assertion that all cultures have some sort of “compens-
atory privacy-regulation mechanisms,” even if  they involve nothing more than “cultural 
customs and verbal and nonverbal behaviors that people use in a compensatory way.”  Alt-
man, at 85.  Altman quotes anthropologist Gregor as noting that “Information on rules of 
privacy…may be buried in descriptions of etiquette, or must be inferred from the character-
istic house type and settlement pattern.”  Altman, at 88, citing Gregor, T.A., Publicity, Pri-
vacy and Mehinacu Marriage.  Ethnology, 1974, 348 (1974).  
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scholar Wing-Tsit Chan insisted several decades ago that there is a well-es-
tablished tradition of privacy in China, particularly with regard to freedom 
of religious thought, and deemed the Daoist “the most rugged individualist 
among the Chinese,” a person who “would have as little government as 
possible.”9  Perhaps Chan had in mind the story of Sun Pu-erh, a Daoist ad-
ept and 12th century Chinese noblewoman who wanted to travel alone to the 
city of Loyang to further her training.  Her teacher told her she could not go 
because she was so beautiful she would surely be raped, whereupon she 
heated a wok full of cooking oil and threw it on her face to disfigure herself.  
She then dressed up and acted as a mad beggar woman, which enabled her 
not only to travel to Loyang alone but reside there for 12 years in solitude in  
an abandoned house.10  Clearly, there are East Asians who value their pri-
vacy.
As a practical matter, it makes little sense to exclude Asian voices from 
the global privacy dialogue. As of June 2012, of the 2.4 billion Internet users 
worldwide, 44.8%, or just over one billion, are in Asia.  Of the one billion 
Asian  users,  65%,  or  702  million,  are  in  the  People’s  Republic  of  China 
(PRC), Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan.11 South Korea has the 
highest per capita penetration of broadband access of any nation on earth, 
followed  closely  by  Singapore,  Taiwan  and  Hong  Kong.12  Any  privacy 
standard purporting to be universal or “global” in scope would have to ad-
dress the needs of this population as well as trans-border transfers of data 
to  and from East  Asia.13 An international  instrument  that  arises  from a 
strictly or predominantly Western dialogue is likely to be viewed not as a 
“global” privacy standard, but as yet another manifestation of Western cul-
tural imperialism.14  Alternatively, Western privacy laws could be embraced 
9 Wing-Tsit Chan, 24-25.  
10 This story comes from the sixteenth century folk novel The Seven Daoist Masters, which 
documents seven disciples of Daoist master Wang Ch’ung-Yang who eventually achieved 
the Dao and are called the Seven Perfected.  Sun Pu-erh is said to have eventually de -
veloped a following in Loyang.  A work called The Codified Sayings of the Primordial God-
dess Sun Pu-erh, which contains meditation practices for women, “may be the work of her  
disciples.”   Deborah  Sommer,  ed.,  Chinese  Religion:  An  Anthology  of  Sources  205-210 
(1995)(contains a translated excerpt from The Seven Daoist Masters).  
11 “Internet Usage in Asia,” available at  http://www.internetworldstats.com.  The PRC alone 
accounts for 360 million Internet users. 
12 Strategy  Analytics:  U.S.  Ranks  20th in  Global  Broadband  Household  Penetration/South 
Korea  Leads  with  95%  in  2008,  Press  Release,  June  18,  2009,  available  at 
http://www.strategyanalytics.com/default.aspx?mod=PressReleaseViewer&a0=4748. 
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by non-Western countries, but in a manner that runs contrary to their spirit 
or that leads to unexpected and undesirable results.15   
Nonetheless, current discussions of so-called “global” privacy standards, 
which seek to regulate the transborder movement of personal data, often re-
semble little more than hair-splitting between American and European per-
spectives over whether the individual right to privacy is primarily a matter 
of civil liberty or of human dignity, and whether an omnibus data protec-
tion law or a sectoral approach to legislation is the better means to protect 
that right.16 The most enthusiastic supporters of “global” privacy standards 
have pursued their agenda through the largely European-dominated Inter-
national Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners (ICDP-
PC),17 as well as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
13 The People’s Republic of China is now the EU’s second largest trading partner behind the 
U.S., with exports almost tripling between 1999 and 2005.  May-Britt Stumbaum, “Engaging 
China—Uniting Europe? EU Foreign Policy Towards China,” in Nicola Casarini, Costanza 
Musu, eds., European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System 57 (2007).  The EU 
is also China’s largest trading partner, ahead of both the U.S. and Japan.  Nicola Casarini, 
“The Evolution of the EU-China Relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic 
partnership,” Occasional Paper No. 64, October 2006, published by the European Union In-
stitute for Security Studies, at 7.  “China’s determination to strengthen economic ties and in-
tensify technology transfers with the EU is closely linked with Beijing’s definition of its na-
tional core interests.  Id. at 13 (emphasis added).  According to Stumbaum, the EU’s ap-
proach  towards  China  is  “biased  towards  economics,”  and  because  EU member  states  
primarily see China as “a huge business opportunity,” they are highly competitive with one 
another; this intra-EU competititon “prevents better coordination of European efforts and 
therefore undermines achievement of an influential European Foreign and Security Policy.” 
Stumbaum, at 58.  This includes,  apparently,  human rights policy.   The European Com-
munity initially froze its relations with China and imposed sanctions in 1989 following the 
Tienanmen Square massacre, but under strong pressure from EU member states (France 
simply disregarded the sanctions, starting in December 1989), the EU gradually lifted all 
such sanctions and restored EU-China relations in October 1990.  Id. at 59.  In 1998,  EU 
member states agreed that at the upcoming session of the U.N. Council on Human Rights 
(UNHRC), the EU would “neither propose, nor endorse” any resolution criticizing China. 
“This position not to co-sponsor the UNHCR resolution with the U.S. has remained con-
stant in the [EU General Affairs Council] since 1998.”  Casarini, at 19.  Instead, there is a  
separate EU-China human rights dialogue, to which the United States is not privy.  Id. at 19-
20.  
All of this would suggest the possibility that the EU’s emphasis on the “fundamental human 
right to privacy,” as it pertains to transborder transfers of personal data is being much more 
vigorously enforced vis-à-vis the United States than vis-à-vis China (if it is in fact enforced 
at all with regard to the latter).  I could find no examples of “Safe Harbor”-type frameworks 
governing the transfer of data between the EU and China, similar to the framework adopted 
by the United States in response to the 1995 EU Data Directive, which severely restricted 
transfers of data to third countries that do not meet the EU’s “adequacy” standard of data 
protection, and which at the time was thought to present a serious barrier to US-EU interna-
tional  trade  (for  information  on  the  Safe  Harbor  Framework,  see 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/).  While EU-Chinese trade is still more likely focused on 
products and not services, it is not at all clear how EU member states are able to carry on so 
much trade with China consistent with the 1995 EU Data Directive, as it is virtually incon -
ceivable that China’s legal protections for personal data are considered “adequate” by EU 
standards.  
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ment  (OECD).18  The  Asia-Pacific  Economic  Cooperation  (APEC)19 de-
veloped its own Privacy Framework in 2004 and a system of Cross Border 
Privacy Rules in 2012, but its standards have been dismissed by Western 
privacy advocates  as an attempt to ‘shift the balance in privacy protection 
away from individual control towards business interests,’ because of its use 
of industry self-regulation through contractual  relationships with private 
accountability agents.20  Some have speculated that the APEC Framework 
would not exist “without the influence of U.S. business interests,” who were 
14 Inoue Tatsuo, “Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism,” in The East Asian Challenge for 
Human Rights, Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds., 29-30 (1999).  Tatsuo notes that 
Singapore’s ex-premier, Lee Kuan Yew, and Malaysia’s premier, Mahathir Mohamad, were 
both strident in their challenge to the “hegemony” of liberal democracy, particularly during 
the early 1990s.  Id. at 27 n 2. Onuma Yasuaki explains that [t]he problem…is that most na-
tions with serious violations of human rights and that are thus the targets of criticism were  
once under colonial rule and the victims of military intervention and economic exploitation 
by developed countries.  Because of this humiliating past, they tend to respond to criticism 
by the developed countries in an excessively sensitive manner.  For those who have experi -
enced  colonial  rule  and  interventions  under  such  beautiful  slogans  as  “humanity”  and 
“civilization,” the term “human rights” looks like nothing more than another beautiful slo-
gan by which great powers rationalize their interventionist policies. 
Onuma Yasuaki, “Toward an Intercivilizational Approach to Human Rights,” in The East 
Asian Challenge for Human Rights, Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds., 105.  
15 For example, Yohko Orito and Kiyoshi Murata assert that the Japanese Act on the Protection 
of Personal Information (APPI), which started being enforced in 2005 in response to “ex -
ternal pressure from the international community,” is being “overzealously” applied, to the 
point that the relatives of the victims of the 2005 JR Fukichiyama train disaster were unable 
to obtain vital information about their loved ones from local hospitals.  Yokho Orito and  
Kiyoshi Murata, Rethinking the Concept of Information Privacy:  A Japanese Perspective, 
Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society, Vol. 6 Issue 3 pp. 233, 245 
(2008), available online at www.kisc.meiji.ac.jp/~ethicj/Orito.pdf. Orito and Murata attribute 
this “excessive rigidity” in enforcement to the fact that most Japanese don’t really under -
stand the Western concept of privacy, and thus conclude that “protecting the right to in-
formation privacy is equivalent to abiding by APPI.”  Id.  Of course, this is not a problem 
unique to Japan; there are similar reports regarding the overzealous enforcement of HIPAA 
in  the  United States.   See,  e.g.,  Bonnie  Darves,  “From Minor  Annoyances  to  Treatment 
Delays, Physicians Feeling Fallout of HIPAA Privacy Law,” ACP Internist (2003), available 
at http://www.acpinternist.org/archives/2003/09/privacy.htm.  
16 See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 
Yale L.J. 1151 (2004); Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 Yale L.J. 902 (2009); Pa-
tricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy Law, 118 Yale L.J. 868 (2009).  All EU 
member states are bound by  Directive  95/46/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the 
Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data (“Data Protection Directive”). Official 
Journal  L  281  ,  23/11/1995  P.  0031  –  0050,  available  at  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML (last  checked 
Jan. 31, 2011).  The Data Protection Directive requires member states to enact an omnibus 
data protection law and appoint an “independent” data protection or privacy commission-
er.  Any nation-state either inside or outside the EU that is lacking either a data protection  
law or an independent commissioner is deemed to have “inadequate” data protection.  Per-
sonal data may flow freely between EU member states but may not be transferred outside of 
the EU to any country that does not meet the EU’s “adequacy” standard, including the 
United States.  The Data Protection Directive provides the basic model for most of the pro-
posals for “global privacy standards” arising in European circles.  
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motivated by “concerns regarding the [European Union’s] approach [to pri-
vacy regulation] to other jurisdictions.”21 
Non-Western philosophy also provides a means of taking Cohen’s cri-
tique of Western political liberalism much farther back in time than Kant, to 
certain metaphysical  presumptions that  are ultimately Platonic  and Aris-
totelian in origin.  It at the metaphysical level, and not in the 18th century 
political works of Kant, where classical East Asian and Western thought di-
verge, in ways that have ramifications for notions of selfhood, privacy and 
the underlying “rhetoric of liberty” that Cohen so effectively deconstructs. 
There is not only a profound difference between classical Eastern and West-
ern thought at the metaphysical level (with many commonalities between 
Daoism and the postmodernist thought supported by Cohen),22 but much 
evidence to suggest also a correlation between East-West metaphysical di-
vergences and other East-West differences in cognitive and behavioral pat-
terns.23 These differences are not rooted in race or biology; indeed, they are 
not only socially constructed but highly malleable, with considerable vari-
ety within cultures,  and exposure to a different  culture eventually alters 
one’s own mode of thinking and even one’s understanding of selfhood.24 
They also vary considerably within cultures.25  At the same time, these dif-
ferences are reflected in many forms of East-West interpersonal interaction, 
from business negotiations, to dispute resolution mechanisms, to the devel-
opment of international human rights standards,  in ways in which those 
17 The ICDPPC, a group whose membership consists solely of data protection and privacy 
commissioners, hosts an annual conference.  Its membership criteria are somewhat obscure,  
and it was only recently that the U.S. Federal Trade Commission was granted voting mem-
ber status. The European influence on the conference is evident from the list of participants 
in the development of a Joint Proposal for Setting International Standards on Privacy and 
Personal  Data  Protection,  at 
http://www.privacyconference2009.org/dpas_space/Resolucion/index-iden-idphp.php.   See 
also generally: http://www.privacyconference2013.org. 
18  The OECD is an intergovernmental organization headquartered in Paris, France.  It has 30 
member countries, 23 of which are European (the other seven include Australia, Canada, Ja-
pan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, and the United States). See http://www.oecd.org. The re-
cently revised OECD Guidelines for the Protection of Privacy and the Transborder Flow of  
Personal Data can be found at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/privacy.htm. 
19 APEC has 21 member states, including Australia, Brunei,  Canada, Chile, the PRC, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
Peru,  the  Philippines,  Russia,  Singapore,  Chinese  Taipei  (Taiwan),  Thailand,  the  United 
States,  and Vietnam.  See  http://www.apec.org/apec/member_economies.html.  The APEC 
Cross  Border  Privacy  Rules  can  be  found  at http://www.apec.org/Groups/Commit-
tee-on-Trade-and-Investment/Electronic-Commerce-Steering-Group.aspx. 
20 Nigel Waters, “The APEC Cross Border Privacy Rules: A Civil Society Perspective,” Privacy 
International,  July  3,  2013,  at  https://www.privacyinternational.org/blasts/the-apec-cross-
border-privacy-rules-system-a-civil-society-perspective. 
21 Chris  Connelly,  “Asia-Pacific  Region  at  the  Privacy  Crossroads  (2008),  available  at 
http://www.galexia.com. 
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participating in such cross-cultural dialogue may not be fully or consciously 
aware.26 Which direction the causal link runs as between philosophy, his-
tory, culture, politics and ecology scarcely matters, so long as the examina-
tion of one can help illuminate the others.
I therefore hope with this article to instigate a more inclusive and global 
conversation about privacy, by examining both privacy and privacy rights 
through the lens of traditional Daoist metaphysics.  My decision to focus on 
Daoism is made for several reasons.  First, Daoism has provided the meta-
physical foundation for all major schools of Chinese philosophy,27 as well as 
for Zen Buddhism. Chinese philosophy, in turn, has been the predominant 
source of philosophical thought and political theory throughout Northeast 
22 Indeed, many of the postmodernist scholars cited by Cohen likely owe Daoism a certain  
conceptual debt.  Gadamer was heavily influenced by his mentor Martin Heidegger, who 
repeatedly has been accused of incorporating Chinese and Japanese philosophy into his 
own work without attribution. See infra note 97. Deleuze resorts to the use of Zen koans, 
along with Lewis Carroll references, as a means of demonstrating the paradoxical and ulti -
mately nonsensical nature of Western logic. Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense 136-137; see  
also 8 (1990 [1969]).  Altman, who makes one of the strongest cases yet for privacy as a uni -
versal human need, cites to the I Ching and uses a yin-and-yang symbol to diagram the dy-
namic and opposing interplay between openness and closedness as equally important com-
ponents of privacy.  Irwin Altman and Martin Chemers, Culture and Environment 77-78 
(1980).  Some have speculated that Foucault’s criticism of Western morality and technologies 
of  power  was  fueled  by  “a  preoccupation  with  Eastern  thought,  including 
Buddhism….Schaub suggests that Foucault’s constant questioning of limits and his explora-
tions of transgressivity were influenced by an Eastern ‘counter-discourse that appropriates 
Oriental lore in opposition to Western strategies of control’….”  Janet Afary and Kevin B. 
Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism 17 
(2005)(citing Ua Liebmann Schaub, “Foucault’s Oriental Subtext,” PMLA 104, no. 3, 306-16, 
at 306-308 (1989)).  
23 See generally Richard E. Nisbett, the Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners 
Think Differently…And Why (2003).  These differences even appear to have an effect on the 
practice of clinical psychology.  In Japan, Western-style psychoanalysis is rather unpopular, 
“despite a large number of existing publications on Freud and his work.”  Chikako Ozawa-
de Silva, Demystifying Japanese Therapy: An Analysis of Naikan and the Ajase Complex 
through Buddhist Thought, Ethos Vol. 35, Issue 4, pp. 411-446 (2007), at 419.  Instead, a sys-
tem called Naikan, developed by a Zen Buddhist businessman in the 1940s, is increasingly 
being viewed as a very effective form of psychotherapy for alcoholism, gambling and drug 
addictions, eating disorders, anxiety disorders, marital problems, and other psychological 
issues.   Id.  at  413-14.   Unlike Western psychotherapies,  which emphasize  independence 
from others, Naikan seeks a reintegration of or “resocialization” of the self, a “recovering of 
the sense of oneness or unity with the other.” Id. at 419.  Naikan was once considered a ther-
apy that would only work within a Japanese cultural context, but there are now five mental  
health centers that offer Naikan in Austria, two in Germany, two in Switzerland, one in 
Spain, one in Canada and one in the United States.  Id. at 425.  In the United States, Asian  
Americans are believed to underuse available mental health services, in part because they 
may think “that the problems reflect hereditary flaws that shame the family,” and in part  
because they come from cultures in which mental health is defined not by happiness or the 
ability to share feelings, but by the ability to work hard, provide for the family, and main-
tain good interpersonal relationships.  Laura Uba, Asian Americans: Personality Patterns, 
Identity and Mental Health 196-201 (1994).  Asian Americans also “tend to express their 
psychological problems in the form of psychosomatic symptoms,” and, because many Asian 
Americans do not make a sharp distinction between mind and body in the way that most 
Westerners do, they may seek the services of physicians, herbalists, spiritualists, or other 
providers of holistic medicine instead of seeking out a mental health specialist.  Uba, at 201. 
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Asia (China, Korea and Japan) for thousands of years, in much the same 
way that ancient Greece provided the foundation for Western philosophy.  I 
make no claim that any particular  number modern East Asians consider 
themselves “Daoist,” or for that matter, take an interest in philosophy at all.  
However, given that Eastern philosophy has covered the same range of is-
sues and with the same degree of sophistication as its Western counterparts,  
the fact that certain ideas and philosophers rose to prominence in some so-
cieties but not others points to deeper cultural and historical differences that 
are still relevant today.28  Exploring Daoism is thus, at the very least, a reas-
onable initial attempt to include in the global privacy dialogue the tradi-
tions of the 702 million current Internet users who are Chinese, Japanese or 
Korean.
Second, to the extent Daoist notions of selfhood track with the postmod-
ernist conception espoused by Cohen, the fact that Daoism has had such a 
profound influence on East Asian thought renders East Asia somewhat of a 
living laboratory for Cohen’s theories.   If  a society were to be organized 
around Cohen’s postmodernist ideas of the socially situated and embodied 
self, free from the ideological commitments of political liberalism fomented 
by Kant, what would such a society look like?  I contend that it would look 
a great deal like East Asia, with its generally greater tendencies towards col-
lectivistic social organization than is typically seen in the West (particularly 
the United States).   The history and current state of privacy and privacy 
rights in East Asia are to some degree a litmus test of Cohen’s approach to  
selfhood, a way of assessing if Cohen’s view of selfhood, if thoroughly in-
24 As Nisbett explains with regard to the results of his own research, “My claim is not that the 
cognitive differences we find in the laboratory cause the differences in attitudes, values, and 
behaviors, but that the cognitive differences are inseparable from the social and motivation-
al ones.  People hold the beliefs they do because of the way they think and they think the 
way they do because of the nature of the societies they live in.” Nisbett, 201.  This assertion 
seems fully consistent with many of the postmodernist assertions about the socially-con-
structed self to which Cohen has cited.  
25 The  studies  reported  by  social  psychologist  Richard Nisbett  indicate,  for  example,  that 
white American protestants show the most “Western” patterns of behavior and cognition 
and that Catholics, African-Americans, Latinos and other ethnic minorities, as well as Con-
tinental Europeans, “are shifted somewhat toward Eastern patterns.” Nisbett, 70-71. 
26 For example,  Svensson notes that “although most Chinese have not consciously tried to 
build upon traditional values, this has not prevented them from describing human rights in 
terms that carry some echoes of Confucian views on human dignity and self-cultivation.”  
Svensson, at 56.  
27 Hua Hsaio-Peng, at 2.  
28 As Stephen Angle notes, “reviewing the history of Chinese rights discourse helps us to ap-
preciate the wisdom of seeing moral traditions as contingent and rooted in historical partic-
ularity.” Angle, Stephen C., Human Rights and Chinese Thought:  A Cross-Cultural Inquiry 
19-20 (2002).
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ternalized within a society’s written and unwritten rules of conduct, results 
in privacy being more appreciated and valued by that society, or less val-
ued.
As this article discusses, a wave of recent scholarship examining how 
privacy has been experienced in East Asian cultures makes readily apparent 
that the universal need for privacy is felt just as acutely in East Asian cul-
tures as in Western cultures, with equally robust traditions and practices. 
Indeed, there is much in recent East Asian studies to suggest that Cohen’s 
postmodernist notions of selfhood, as exemplified in East Asian culture and 
society, result in a more nuanced and thorough understanding of privacy. 
The East Asian experience also validates Altman’s conception of privacy as a 
dynamic process of navigating one’s interpersonal boundaries, a universal 
human need to which virtually anyone of any society can relate regardless 
of whether the society is more or less collectivistic than any other society. 
There is, quite simply, no discernible link between a culture’s tendency to-
ward individualism or collectivism and the value it places on privacy.  
The rub is that, while political liberalism is not necessary for an under-
standing of privacy, the East Asian experience suggests that the Kantian tra-
dition is somewhat necessary for the rule of law, at least in the traditional 
Western sense of the term.  East Asia has a tradition of privacy, but not pri-
vacy rights.  What is novel to East Asia is Western legalism, i.e., “the view 
that law and legal institutions can keep order and resolve policy disputes,” 
through a combination of “powerful courts, a dominant class of lawyers, 
and reliance in legalistic procedures in policymaking bodies.”29  The irony is 
that, while many in the privacy community will  read Cohen’s innovative 
theories as providing a basis on which to build global privacy standards, 
many current proposed methods for achieving privacy protection through 
legal instruments are hopelessly  Rawlsian.  
These conclusions are set forth in the following sections.  First,  I  will  
provide a brief overview of Daoism and Zen thought, and describe four key 
aspects of Daoist metaphysics that both differ from the Western metaphysic-
al tradition, and that are to some extent reflected in modern cognitive differ-
ences between Westerners and East Asians.  Second, I will relate these meta-
physical differences to differing East/West notions of selfhood.  Fourth, I 
will examine the nascent interdisciplinary scholarship exploring East Asian 
29  Eric A. Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism 21 (2009).  
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concepts of privacy that I contend generally vindicates Cohen’s approach. 
Finally, I will discuss how Daoist/Zen metaphysics and East Asian concepts 
of selfhood affect East Asian views towards Western legalism, and what im-
plications this has for the development of global privacy standards.   My 
conclusion is that the pursuit of global privacy standards is a worthwhile 
endeavor, but that the proponents of such standards would benefit  from 
taking a few cues from Daoism, particularly the principle of wu wei.
2. CONTRASTING DAOIST AND WESTERN METAPHYSICS 
Daoism  is  one  of  three  major  systems  of  classical  Chinese  thought  that 
emerged between the sixth and second centuries, B.C., the other two being 
Confucianism and Moism,30 The two major works of classical Daoism in-
clude the Daodejing, generally attributed to Laozi sometime in the fourth 
century B.C.; and the Zhuangzi, attributed to the author of the same name, 
sometime in the late fourth century to third century B.C (The Yijing,  or 
“Book of Change,” along with the concept of yin and yang, appears to pre-
date both Daoism and Confucianism).31 Both the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi 
establish the concept of Dao, a term that “is transcendentally used to refer to 
the inexpressible ontology of the Universe.”32 While the Dao is considered 
indescribable, Laozi “attempted to present the closest concrete example, by 
using the analogy of the natural phenomenon of water to manifest Dao’s 
properties.”33  
30 Chan Wing-Tsit,  “The Story of Chinese Philosophy,” in The Chinese Mind: Essentials of 
Chinese Philosophy and Culture, Charles A. Moore, ed., 31 (1967).  Moism takes its name 
from Mozi (Mo Tzu), who advocated a sort of “utilitarian humanism” which rejected the  
ritualism and formalism of Confucianism.  Id. at 42-45.  As historian Fung Yu-Lan points 
out, from the fifth through the third centuries B.C. there were so many schools of thought 
that they are sometimes referred to as “the hundred schools.”  Fung Yu-Lan, A Short His-
tory of Chinese Philosophy 30 (1948).  Fung divides them into six schools, the Yin-Yang 
Chia or Yin-Yang School, the Ju Chia or School of Literati (known in the West as the Con-
fucianist school), the Mo Chia or Mohist school, the Ming Chia or School of Names, the Fa 
Chia or Legalist School, and the Dao-De Chia or School of the Way and its Power.  Id., 30-31. 
Moism had largely died out by the end of the Ch’in period.  Kung-Chuan Hsiao, A History 
of Chinese Political Thought 428 (1979).
31 Hua Hsiao-Peng, Chun-Yen Chang and Maggie Maeve MacRaven, Daoism and Its Implica-
tions for Science Education, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the National Associ-
ation for Research and Science Teaching, Boston, Massachusetts, USA, March 28-31, 1999, at 
2; accord Herrlee G. Creel, What is Daoism? And Other Studies in Chinese Cultural History 
1-2 (1970).  With regard to the authorship of these documents, Creel points out that “Many 
scholars have long since agreed that the Chuang Tzu [Zhuangzi] is a compilation of Daoist 
documents from various hands, and the same is probably true of the [Laozi].”  Creel, at 38.  
32 Hua Hsiao-Peng, supra, at 3.  
33 Hua Hsiao-Peng, supra, at 3.  
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Despite the predominance of Confucian political thought for the most re-
cent 800 years of Northeast Asian history, 34 Daoist metaphysics continue to 
exert a heavy influence on East Asian philosophy for several reasons.  First, 
it is virtually uncontested that Zen Buddhism is built upon basic principles 
of  Daoism;  Jay  Griggs  goes  so  far  as  to  call  Zen  “Taoism  disguised  as 
Buddhism.”35 Second, beginning in the Song Dynasty (960-1279), Chinese 
philosophers started a movement that is now called “neo-Confucianism,”36 
which incorporated certain aspects of Daoist thought into Confucianist so-
cial  philosophy.   Daoism gave Confucianist  social  and political  theory  a 
metaphysical basis, and in the process became legitimized and institutional-
ized  into  both  Confucianism and Buddhism.37  Thus,  neo-Confucianism, 
which came to dominate political thought in the centuries that followed as it 
spread into Korea and Japan,38 also spread Daoism. 
There are four specific aspects of Daoist metaphysics (which are also re-
flected in Zen) that differ from Western thought in ways relevant to current 
thinking about privacy.  Each of these aspects was incorporated into neo-
Confucianism and continues to manifest itself in East Asian thought today, 
with a strong correlation between Daoism and modern East-West cognitive 
differences, as documented by social psychologist Richard Nisbett and his 
colleagues.  It is at this level, the metaphysical level, that the groundwork is 
laid for an East Asian concept of selfhood that is quite different from the 
Kantian/Rawlsian  version,  much  closer  to  Cohen’s  postmodernist  ideal, 
with ramifications both for privacy and for the rule of law and notions of 
justice.   In exploring these metaphysical differences, it  becomes apparent 
that the Kantian notion of individual identity is the natural by-product of a 
basic Western metaphysical outlook that simply does not represent a global 
consensus.
The first aspect of Daoism that differs from the Western tradition con-
cerns the individual’s ability to apprehend and express reality, and specific-
ally, to resolve the “opposition and tension between actualities and ideas, 
34 Wing-Tsit Chan, “The Story of Chinese Philosophy,” at 57. 
35 Gregg, xiii; accord Bodde, D. “Harmony and Conflict in Chinese Philosophy,” in Wright, A., 
ed. Studies in Chinese Thought 56 (1953).
36 Wing-Tsit Chan, “The Story of Chinese Philosophy,” at 56.
37 Gregg, 48.
38 See Palais, James B. Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyongwon and the 
Late Choson Dynasty 5-9 (1996), which dates the neo-Confucian influence in Korea to 1392; 
and S.N. Eisenstadt, Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View (1996), at 194, which notes 
that neo-Confucianism became widely adopted during the Tokugawa period in Japan, start-
ing in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
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immanence and transcendence,  individual  and universal,  [and]  temporal 
and eternal.”39  Zen scholar Masao Abe calls this the tension between ji (the 
particular) and ri (the universal).  Zen resolves the tension with the concept 
of Mu, which Abe translates into English as “Emptiness,” for lack of a better 
term. Mu is neither being nor non-being, neither particular nor universal, 
and neither positive nor negative.  Abe finds the origins of Mu to be rooted 
in part in the Daoist concept of the Dao.40
Comparative  scholars  tend to  pinpoint  Plato  as  representing  a  major 
point of departure between the Dao/Zen and Western traditions in this re-
gard.  In The Cratylus,41 for example, Plato concludes that absolute reality is 
not really in flux, for if it were constantly changing, accurate or “absolute” 
knowledge would be impossible.  The Zuangzi takes the same problem and 
reaches precisely  the  opposite  result:   that,  because  the  universe  is  con-
stantly changing, absolute knowledge is impossible.42  
Plato ultimately comes to the conclusion, known as his Theory of Forms 
or  Theory of Ideas  and explained famously through the  Allegory of  the 
Cave,43 that the material world known to us through sensation is not the 
true reality, as it is constantly changing, but that the Ideas or Forms which 
are the original prototype for these ephemeral material phenomena are true 
being, and the only true objects of study that can provide genuine know-
ledge.44  In doing so, according to Masao Abe, Plato  elevates the status of 
“being” over “non-being” and positivity over negativity, and never adopts 
such a concept as Dao or Mu. 45 
39 Abe, Masao, “Zen and Western Thought,” in Zen and Western Thought, William R. Fleur, 
ed. (1985), at 84.
40 See Abe,  Masao, “Zen and Western Thought,” 124-126.  Abe notes that the Upanishadic 
Philosophy of ancient India also had a theory of oneness related to the oneness of Brahman  
and atman, “the seer who cannot be seen, the knower who cannot be known.”  Id. at 125. 
41 The Cratylus, available on line at http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/cratylus.html. 
42 Herrlee G. Creel, “The Great Clod,” in What is Daoism? And Other Studies in Chinese Cul-
tural History (1970), 26-27. 
43 Plato, the Republic, Book VII, in Plato Part I, The Republic, Part II, The Statements, trans-
lated by George Burges, MA (1901), at 233 et seq. 
44 See Abe, at 122
45 Abe notes that Daoism parts ways with Confucianism in this regard:
In the East, people who have identified themselves with the Confucian tradition, have em-
phasized human ethics and the intrinsic goodness of the human.  Having thus understood 
positivity and negativity in a way not unlike Western humanism, their  view of  what it  
means to be genuinely human has a common element with certain traditions in the West. 
Daoists and Buddhists, however, have maintained that the idea of nothingness is ultimate, 
and in this sense they have no Western counterpart.
120 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 7:2
Aristotle,  Kant  and  many  other  Western  philosophers  have  quibbled 
with the Theory of the Forms, but a constant that runs throughout most of 
Western philosophy is  the  notion that  the  use  of  human intellect,  when 
freed from bodily sensation, can not only apprehend ultimate reality but 
can also articulate it,  and that this is,  in fact,  the purpose of philosophy. 
This tendency manifests itself in the 20th century work of John Rawls, whose 
scholarship on justice and fairness promotes what Amartya Sen calls “tran-
scendental institutionalism,” a philosophical inquiry “aimed at identifying 
the nature of ‘the just,’” and seeking “ideals of perfection” for a theoretically 
perfectly just society.46  
The perfect comprehension of absolute reality through abstract modeling 
is  is  not  the  purpose  of  Daoism,  which  often views intellectualism  as  a 
hindrance.  Like traditional Yoga (by which I mean, the Yoga that translates 
from the Sanskrit as “union” and that is generally geared towards higher as-
pirations than the imparting of a few good hamstring stretches),  Daoism 
seeks the resolution of the subject-object, active-passive paradox that was 
invented by self-conscious deliberation.  It puts together the wholeness that 
personal willfulness took apart.  In simplest terms this is done by entering 
the dichotomy and becoming the empty stillness in the center of the para-
dox.47
Indeed, historian Fung Yu-Lan asserts that the purpose of Chinese philo-
sophy in general,  at  least  with regard to metaphysics,  is  to  satisfy  one’s 
Abe,  “Non-Being  and Mu—the Metaphysical  Nature  of  Negativity  in  the  East  and the 
West,” in Zen and Western Thought, at 124.   Abe further explains:
in the West such positive principles as being, life, and the god have ontological priority over 
negative principles such as non-being, death, and evil.  In this sense, negative principles are  
always apprehended as something secondary.  By contrast, in the East, especially in Taoism 
and Buddhism, negative principles are not secondary but co-equal to the positive principles 
and even may be said to be primary and central.  This is so in the sense that the realization 
of negativity is crucial to reveal ultimate Reality, and in the sense that the nameless Tao or  
Emptiness is realized as the root-source of both positive and negative principles in their rel -
ative sense.
Id., 133.
46 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice 6 (2009).  
47 Gregg, 6.  
2013] Lara A. Ballard: The Dao of Privacy 121
“craving for what is beyond the present actual world,” a craving that in the 
West is more likely addressed by religion.48  He adds, 
its function is not the increase of positive knowledge (by positive know-
ledge I mean information regarding matters of fact), but the elevation of the 
mind—a reaching out for what is beyond the present actual world, and for 
the values that are higher than the moral ones…in the tradition of Chinese 
philosophy there is a distinction between working on learning and working 
on Tao (the way).  The purpose of the former is what I call the increase of 
positive knowledge, that of the latter is the elevation of the mind.  Philo-
sophy belongs in the latter category. The view that the function of philo-
sophy, especially metaphysics, is not the increase of positive knowledge, is  
expounded by the Viennese school in contemporary Western philosophy, 
though from a different angle and for a different purpose.49
This is not to say that Daoism is wholly unconcerned with “knowledge,” 
but the type of truth that is sought in Daoism is not believed to be express-
ible in words.  While “[o]ntologically speaking, Taoism would assume a fi-
nal reality exists and this reality is named as ‘Tao,’” this reality “cannot be 
defined directly by human language.”50  The Daodejing begins by asserting 
that  “the  Dao  that  can  be  told  of  is  not  the  eternal  Dao,”  and  legends 
abound of practitioners who demonstrated their achievement of the Dao by 
simply falling silent or smiling.  As the Daoist saying goes, “He who speaks 
does not know, and he who knows does not speak.”  Anyone who litigates  
in U.S. courts on a regular basis or watches cable television news can attest 
that this is quite a foreign concept in the West.  
A second major East-West divergence concerns the Western preoccupa-
tion  with  objects  and the  separation  of  form  from  content.   A constant 
throughout virtually the entire history of Western thought is that absolute 
knowledge  is  possible  with  regard  to  understanding  the  independent 
nature and properties of individual objects.  It is evident in Plato’s preoccu-
pation with the eternal quality of “Forms,” in Aristotle’s Categories,51 and 
throughout Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.52 The tendency seen in the more 
48 Fung Yu-Lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy 4 (1948, 1976).  
49 Fung Yu-Lan, 5. 
50 Hua Hsiao-Peng, at 3. 
51 Aristotle,  Categories,  written 350 B.C.E.,  translated by E.M. Edghill,  available  on line  at 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/categories.html.
52 See, e.g., this quote from Immanuel Kant, A Critique of Pure Reason (Aesthetic), Transcend-
ental Aesthetic, available online at http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/aesth.html: 
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recent works of Rawls, Adam Smith and Jurgen Habermas, extolling the vir-
tues of absolute objectivity among society’s decision-makers as a key com-
ponent of ideal justice (Rawls describes the ideal decision-maker as operat-
ing from behind a “veil of ignorance”),53 reflects this general mindset. The 
emphasis on objects is reflected in Western society even in the manner in 
which Americans teach vocabulary to their children, which results in Amer-
ican children learning nouns at a much faster pace than verbs as compared 
to their East Asian counterparts, who acquire nouns and verbs at a more 
balanced rate.54   
The Eastern tradition tends more toward contextualization and holistic 
analysis.55  Buddhism adheres to the theory of pratitya-samutpada, or “de-
pendent  co-origination,”  which  holds  that  “anything  experienced  by  us 
arises through dependence on something else.  It involve[s] a denial of the 
concept of substantiality; i.e., the concept that anything has a true substan-
tial nature through which it  can exist  independently.”56  This same basic 
concept  is  expressed  in  the  Daodejing,  which  states  that  “Being  is  the 
product of Nonbeing;”57 i.e., one cannot exist without the other.  
As noted above, these philosophical differences are reflected in actual 
cognitive differences between modern East Asians and Westerners.  For ex-
ample,  in an experiment carried out by cognitive psychologists Mutsumi 
Imae and Dedre Gentner, American and Japanese subjects, varying in age 
In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, in-
tuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as  
a means is directed. But intuition takes place only in so far as the object is given to us. This  
again is only possible, to man at least, in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way. The  
capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are af-
fected by objects, is entitled sensibility.  Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and 
it alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the un -
derstanding arise concepts. But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain 
characters relate ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, with us, to sensibility, because in no 
other way can an object be given to us.  
53 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, 6, 31-55 (2009). 
54 See Nisbett, 148-52.  He notes, “Western parents are noun-obsessed, pointing objects out to 
their children, naming them, and telling them about their attributes.  Strange as it may seem 
to Westerners, Asian’s don’t seem to regard object naming as part of the job description for a  
parent.”  Id. at 150.  In a study observing how mothers engage with their infants, “American 
mothers used twice as many object labels as Japanese mothers (“piggie,” “doggie”), and Ja-
panese mothers engaged in twice as many social routines of teaching politeness norms (em-
pathy and greetings, for example).”  Id. 
55 This is not to say that there is no history of analytic thought on par with Plato’s Theory of  
the Forms or Aristotle’s categories.  As noted above, the ancient Chinese School of Names 
explored similar ideas, but appears not to have gained much traction in its surrounding cul-
ture.  See Fung Yu-Lan, at 80-92.  
56 Masao Abe, “Zen, Buddhism and Western Thought,” in Zen and Western Thought, 92-93. 
57 See discussion in Masao Abe, “Zen, Buddhism and Western Thought,” 124-26
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from two years old to adulthood, were shown a pyramid made of cork and 
two other objects, one of which was a white plastic pyramid, the other of 
which had an entirely different shape made of cork.  When asked to identify 
the “match” for the cork pyramid, the Americans would tend to match it to 
the white plastic pyramid, while the Japanese would match it to the object 
made of cork.58
Taken at face value, the Imai and Gentner results indicate that Western-
ers and Asians literally see different worlds.  Like ancient Greek philosoph-
ers, modern Westerners see a world of objects—discrete and unconnected 
things.  Like ancient Chinese philosophers, modern Asians are inclined to 
see a world of  substances—continuous masses of matter.   The Westerner 
sees an abstract statue where the Asian sees a piece of marble; the Westerner 
sees a wall where the Asian sees concrete.  There is much other evidence—
of a historical, anecdotal, and systematic scientific nature—indicating that 
Westerners have an analytic view focusing on salient objects and  their at-
tributes, whereas Easterners have a holistic view focusing on continuities in 
substances and relationships in the environment.59
This tendency towards holistic thinking dovetails with the Daoist 
belief in the inexpressibility of reality.  Nisbett points out that 
[a]nalytic thought, which dissects the world into a limited number of 
discrete objects having particular attributes that can be categorized in clear 
ways, lends itself to being captured in language.  Holistic thought, which re-
sponds to a much wider array of  objects  and their  relations,  and which 
makes fewer sharp distinctions among attributes or categories, is less well 
suited to linguistic representation.”60
This may go a long way towards explaining the relative silence of East 
Asian students in many Western college classrooms.61  It may also explain 
why the Daodejing is written in such sparse, suggestive language.  As Fung 
Yu-Lan explains, 
58 Nisbett, 81, citing Imai, M. and Gentner, D. (1994) “A cross-linguistic study of early word 
meaning: Universal ontology and linguistic influence.”  Cognition 62, 169-200. 
59 Nisbett, 82.  
60 Nisbett, 211.
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epistemological problems arise only when a demarcation between the 
subject  and the  object  is  emphasized…This…explains  why the  language 
used by Chinese philosophy is suggestive but not articulate.  It is not articu-
late, because it does not represent concepts in any deductive reasoning.  The 
philosopher only tells us what he sees.  And because of this, what he tells is 
rich in content, though terse in words.62 
The  third  East-West  divergence  concerns  conceptualizations  of 
change, the passage of time and progress.  The classic Confucian views on 
time and progress are linear in nature, similar to that found in the West. 
The Daoist view is more cyclical and sees the world in constant change.  The 
Confucian and Daoist found some reconciliation in the Yijing, which  con-
ceives of time as cyclic but not in the sense of a mere repetition of opposites  
represented in a closed circle.  The essence of time is change, but the uni-
verse being a continuous whole, nothing is absolutely different and separ-
ated from everything else:  "Everything is constantly changing into some-
thing else, and therefore all things are one."63
This cosmic view depends greatly on the Daoist law of reversal, the no-
tion that “when one thing reaches its extreme, it reverts to the opposite.”64 
This is quite different from the straight linear view of time and progress that 
predominates in Western thinking, and it is once again reflected in modern 
cognitive differences.  In one study, for example, two groups of students, 
Americans and Chinese, were shown graphs of an economic trend (such as 
rising stock prices), and then asked what they thought would happen in the 
future.  The Americans were much more likely than the Chinese to predict 
that the trend would continue.65  Nisbett notes, 
61 See, e.g., Nisbett, 210-11 (describing the experiences of an exasperated Korean graduate stu-
dent studying psychology at Stanford and being “told repeatedly that failure to speak up 
could be taken as an indication of  failure to  understand the material,”  whereas she felt 
strongly that she would not benefit from speaking because the Asian way of understanding 
the material was “not verbal”); Yang Hwei-Jen, “Communication Patterns of Individualistic  
and Collective Cultures: A Value Based Comparison (Nov 1993), presented at the Annual 
Meeting  of  the  Speech  Communication  Association  (79th,  Miami  Beach,  FL,  Nov.  18-21 
(1993)(describing  the  Daoist  “distrust  toward  eloquence”  and  Zen’s  opposition  to  both 
words and “then to the intellect which deals exclusively in words.”)  Available online at 
http://www.eric.ed.gov. 
62 Fung Yu-Lan, 25. 
63 Dy.  
64 Dy. 
65 Nisbett, 104-06.
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[a]ncient  Greek philosophers  were powerfully inclined to believe that 
things don’t change much or, if they really are changing, future change will 
continue in the same direction, or at the same rate, as current change.  And 
the same is true for ordinary modern Westerners.  But like ancient Taoists 
and Confucian philosophers, ordinary modern Asians believe that things 
are constantly changing; and movement in a particular direction, far from 
indicating future changes in the same direction, may be a sign that events 
are about to reverse direction.66
The fourth and final major East-West divergence concerns logic and is 
probably the hardest difference for Westerners to understand or cope with. 
Here, Aristotle generally represents the major point of departure. In the Pri-
or Analytics,  written around 350 B.C.,  Aristotle pioneered both the syllo-
gism  (a  form  of  deductive  argument  consisting  of  a  major  and  minor 
premise and a conclusion), and the practice of abstracting objects or con-
cepts by representing them with single letters (e.g., “If all A is B, and all B is  
C, then all A is C”).67   He also propounded the law of identity (A is A), the 
law of contradiction (A is not non-A), and the law of the excluded middle 
(A cannot be A and not-A).  Despite the fact that Aristotelian logic is now 
rarely  taught  in  formal  logic  classes,  it  “has so  deeply  imbued [modern 
Western] habits of  thought that  it  is  felt  to  be ‘natural’ and self-evident, 
while on the other hand the statement that X is A and not A seems to be 
nonsensical.”68  Heraclitus  of  Ephesus,  a  contemporary  of  Socrates  and 
founder of the philosophical school called Stoicism, took a quite different 
approach to both the law of identity and notions of change; he was known 
for pithy, Laozi-like sayings such as “the road up and the road down is one 
and the same,” and “you could not step twice into the same rivers.”69  How-
ever, among his Greek contemporaries his “puzzling” remarks only earned 
him the moniker “Heraclitus the Obscure,” and later, “the weeping philo-
sopher.”70
In ancient China, by contrast, it was the logicians who were left weeping 
in obscurity.  There were a few minor schools of thought that dabbled in 
66 Nisbett, 103. 
67 Aristotle, Prior Analytics, Book 1, written 350 B.C.E., translated by A.J. Jenkinson, available 
online at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/prior.html.  
68 Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving 68 (1956).  
69 Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations (16th Ed. 1992), at 62.
70 Seneca,  Lucius Annaeus;  John M. Cooper & J.F.  Procopé (translators)  (1995).  Moral and 
Political Essays.
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both logic and abstraction--the Mozi, the foundational work of the Mohist 
school of thought, contains a few chapters on logic and mathematics71--but 
these efforts were “of little influence in the East.”72  By the second century 
A.D.,  such Aristotelian endeavors  had been largely written off  by  main-
stream Chinese thinkers as nothing more than “minute examinations of tri-
fling points in complicated and elaborate statements,”73 just as Heraclitus’ 
work had been marginalized in the West.  As late as the first  millennium 
A.D., there were essentially no traces of a logical approach to understanding 
the world.   Instead there was a trust  in  sense impressions and common 
sense.  And there was never, even among the Logicians and Mohists, a will-
ingness to accept arguments that flew in the face of experience—unlike the 
Greeks, who sometimes seemed quite delighted to deny the evidence of the 
senses.74
Formal logic is certainly essential to mathematical reasoning, and there is 
no  indication that  modern East  Asians lack  familiarity  or  face  particular 
struggles with either.  The difference between the modern East Asian and 
Western approaches to logic has to do with its applicability to philosophy, 
theology and everyday social settings.
In the West, logic has been “central [to philosophy] and the thread of 
transmission  has  never  snapped…”75  Western  philosophers  and  theolo-
gians  (several  of  whom  were  also  prominent  mathematicians)  have  re-
peatedly advanced,  for  example,  formal  logical  arguments  as  “proof”  of 
either the existence or non-existence of God.76  It is hardly surprising that 
the  quintessential  expression of  Enlightenment-era  individualism,  Cogito 
ergo sum, was coined by Rene Descartes, also a mathematician, and also in-
tended literally as a logical “proof” of autonomous human consciousness. 
One would be hard pressed to find East  Asian philosophers engaged in 
such exercises. 
71 See Fung Yu-Lan, 118-19. 
72 Nisbett, 166. The two movements that explored both logical inference and the sort of ab-
stract thinking used in geometry were the Ming Chia (School of Names) and the Mohists.  
Id; accord Fung Yu-Lan  
73 Ssu-ma T’an, Historical Records, Ch. 120 (quoted in FungYu-Lan, 81), referring to the Ming 
Chia or School of Names.  
74 Nisbett, 167. 
75 Graham, A.C. Disputers of the Tao, 6 (1989), quoted in Nisbett, at 165. 
76 See, e.g., the Cosmological Argument presented by Thomas Aquinas, or the Ontological Ar-
gument presented by Anselm of Canterbury.  The latter argument was also presented by 
Rene Descartes in his Fifth Meditation.  Twentieth Century philosopher Bertrand Russell, 
who is also considered one of the founders of modern logic, logically “disproved” the exist -
ence of God in his 1927 essay Why I Am Not a Christian.  
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Nisbett has found modern Americans to be particularly prone to what he 
calls a  “phobia” of logical contradiction in social settings that “may some-
times cause them to become more extreme in their judgments under condi-
tions in which the evidence indicates they should become less extreme.”77 
This “phobia,” he says, “seems related to the long-standing Western inclina-
tion to search for principles that will justify beliefs.  If I can show that some 
principle is guiding my beliefs,  then I can demonstrate that, any appear-
ances to the contrary notwithstanding, my beliefs are consistent with one 
another.”78  Easterners, by contrast, “are not concerned with contradiction in 
the same way that Westerners are.  They have a greater preference for com-
promise solutions and for holistic arguments and they are more willing to 
endorse both of two apparently contradictory arguments.  When asked to 
justify  their  choices,  they  seem  to  move  to  a  compromise,  Middle  Way 
stance instead of referring to a dominating principle.”79  In some East Asian 
cultures, “[t]o argue with logical consistency…may not only be resented but 
also be regarded as immature.”80  In repeated studies, Nisbett and his col-
leagues have found that “East Asians…are more likely to set logic aside in 
favor of typicality and plausibility of conclusions” and “are also more likely 
to set logic aside in favor of the desirability of conclusions.”81  
In place of the Western tendency to believe that any given reality must 
be either A or not-A regardless of the context, Daoism employs a form of  
reasoning that is referred to as either paradoxical logic or dialecticism, and 
is reminiscent of both Heraclitus and Hegel.  Dialecticism “focuses on con-
tradictions and how to resolve them or transcend them or find the truth in 
both.”82  In this tradition, there is no necessary incompatibility between the 
belief that A is the case and the belief that not-A is the case.  On the contrary, 
in the spirit of the Tao or yin-yang principle, A can actually imply that not-A 
is also the case, or at any rate soon will be the case.  Dialectical thought is in 
some ways the opposite of logical thought.  It seeks not to decontextualize 
but to see things in their appropriate contexts: Events do not occur in isola-
tion from other events, but are always embedded in a meaningful whole in 
77 Nisbett, 185. 
78 Nisbett, 183. 
79 Nisbett, 184.
80 Nobuhiro Nagashima, “A reversed world: Or is it?” in R. Horton and R. Finnegan, eds., 
Modes of Thought 96 (1973).
81 Nisbett, 171. 
82 Nisbett, 174.
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which the elements are constantly changing and rearranging themselves. 
To think about an object or event in isolation and apply abstract rules to it is 
to invite extreme and mistaken conclusions.  It is the Middle Way that is the 
goal of reasoning.83
Many Daoist  sayings  and  Zen koans  are  paradoxical  comments,  non 
sequiturs or “apparently nonsensical remarks” designed for the precise pur-
pose of providing a “jolt” to the mind that frees it to comprehend a truth 
“outside the pale of ordinary logic…”84 The Daodejing declares that “[g]rav-
ity is the root of lightness; stillness the ruler of movement.”85  A common lit-
erary  device  found  throughout  the  Zhuangzi  is  described  by  one  of  its 
Western translators as a “pseudological discussion or debate that starts out 
sounding completely rational and sober, and ends by reducing language to 
a gibbering inanity.”86 
As to why these differences exist between East and West, what appears 
to be the prevailing theory is rooted in geography and ecology.  The ancient 
Chinese were mostly landlocked and devoted to settled agriculture, which 
is highly dependent upon the cycles of nature.  The ancient Greeks “lived in 
a maritime country and maintained their prosperity through commerce.”87 
Greek merchants lived in towns, while Chinese farmers and their landlords 
lived with their families, staying in the same location for generations.  The 
Greek formed democratic city-states, while the Chinese formed a “family 
state.”88  The Greeks had to engage in  trade and other interactions with 
strangers a wide variety of foreign cultures, whereas the Chinese needed 
primarily to cooperate with one another.  These differences may well have 
affected how each culture came to process information, perceive reality, and 
resolve conflict, though this theory leaves many questions unanswered.
The Western tendency towards confident rationalism reached its apex, 
not with Kant, but with Descartes, Cartesian dualism, 17th century scientists 
like Newton, and the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, yet 
83 Nisbett, 27.
84 Burton Watson, trans., Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings 1 (1964), quoted in Griggs, 24.
85 Laozi. Dao De Jing: The Book of the Way. Berkeley: University of California Press, c2001 
2001
86 Burton Watson, trans., quoted in Griggs, at 24.
87 Fung Yu-Lan, 25.  
88 Fung Yu-Lan, 25-26; accord Nisbett, 34-35.  S. Hayashi “has claimed that rice agriculture has 
affected Japanese characteristics; growing rice requires a collective decision-making process, 
making the group more valuable than the individual.”  Yohko Orito and Kiyoshi Murata, 
Privacy Protection in Japan: Cultural Influence on the Universal Value, supra note [??], cit-
ing Hayashi, S. Management and culture, Chuko-Shinsyo (in Japanese), 84-87 (1984).  
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another  mathematician  “who  tried  to  resolve  the  most  profound  moral 
problems by the use of his reason.”89  Kant was brought up in the Leibniz 
tradition, but was, according to Kant himself, “awakened from my dogmat-
ic slumber” by the publication by David Hume in 1752 of Enquiry Concern-
ing Human Understanding.90  Hume, following somewhat in the empiricist 
tradition of John Locke, asserted that “reason…can never pretend to any 
other  office than to serve and obey the passions.”  He believed that  the 
scope of human knowledge was limited to sense impressions and the im-
ages formed in the mind as their result.  He also asserted that we have no  
knowledge or experience of cause and effect; we merely assume that what 
happened in the past will continue to happen.91  Kant realized the threat 
that Hume’s philosophy posed to Enlightenment rationalism and to the pur-
suit of knowledge generally, and his goal in publishing  A Critique of Pure  
Reason in 1781 was to “rescue science from Humean skepticism.”92 In order 
to do so, he created two sharply different categories.  The realm of science,  
which is useful knowledge, deals with the phenomenal world, the world of 
appearances.  The realm of value, of moral and esthetic experience, is intuit -
ive and deals with the noumenal world….One of his achievements was to 
riddle  the  proofs  of  God’s  existence  derived  from  the  facts  of  physical 
nature….Kant devastated all these venerable “proofs” with such effective-
ness that few have dared to revive them since.  The proofs appropriate to 
science have nothing to do with God, Kant believed.  For they can never 
give us values.93
In so doing, Kant preserved the essence of the Western metaphysical tra-
dition with regard to the physical sciences, while carving out a “noumenal 
realm” in which he conceded doubt that we could ever know it at all, except 
to “glimpse it fleetingly” in “moments of moral or esthetic experience.”94 
Fung Yu-Lan sees this as a great step forward in Western philosophy in that 
Kant adopted the “negative method of metaphysics” typified by Daoism 
and Zen.   Fung asserts that “[t]he business of  metaphysics is  not to say 
something about the unknowable, but only to say something about the fact 
89 Roland M. Stromberg, An Intellectual History of Modern Europe 120 (1975).  
90 Stromberg, 160, 215.
91 Stromberg, 160-161.  
92 Stromberg, 216. 
93 Stromberg, 217-18. 
94 Stromberg, 218.  
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that the unknowable is unknowable.  When one knows that the unknowable 
is unknowable, one does know, after all, something about it.”95
It was not until the 1920s, with the publication of Martin Heidegger’s Be-
ing and Time and Alfred North Whitehead’s  Process and Reality, that any of 
these underlying assumptions of Western philosophy were directly ques-
tioned,  in ways that  led to Western postmodernism.  This occurred only 
after the 1907 publication of a popular work by Okakura Kakuzo entitled 
The Book of Tea, in which the philosophy of Zhuangzi was introduced to a 
large Western audience.  The similarities between Whitehead’s philosophy 
and Mahayana Buddhism are widely recognized,96 and Whitehead himself 
said that his philosophy was similar to those in the Eastern tradition. Heide-
gger has been directly accused of incorporating Daoism and Kakuzo’s work 
directly into his own without proper attribution.97  Neither Whitehead nor 
Heidegger credited the classical Eastern works from which they may well 
have drawn their inspiration; instead, interestingly enough, they both cited 
frequently to Heraclitus of Ephesus in support of their assertions.98 
Meanwhile,  the bulk of Western rationalism was largely preserved in 
Western legal thought, including the line of thought running from Kant to 
Rawls.  Neither Kant nor any of his philosophical progeny have departed 
from the Western obsession with independent objects, mind-body dualism 
or the linear notion of time.  It was on the Kantian foundation that Rawls 
constructed his own theories of justice and fairness.   Moreover, as will be 
seen in the next section, it is also on this Western rationalist foundation that 
Kant, Habermas and Rawls rest their assumptions about the autonomous 
self as a legal subject, assumptions that, as Cohen points out, are crucial to 
understanding the limitations of the prevalent Western concept of privacy. 
95 Fung Yu-Lan, 341.  
96 See, e.g., Masao Abe, “Mahayana Buddhism and Western Thought,” in Zen and Western 
Thought 152-170; 
97 See, e.g., Reinhard May, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East-Asian Influences on His  Work 
(2001).  Graham Parkes asked Heidegger’s protégé, Gadamer, why Heidegger would only 
have cited to Daoism twice in over 50 years’ worth of publications if he was so enthusiastic  
about it.   Gadamer replied, “You have to understand that a scholar of the generation to 
which Heidegger belongs would be very reluctant to say anything in print about a philo-
sophy if he were unable to read and understand the relevant texts in the original language.” 
Graham Parkes, Heidegger and Asian Thought 7 (YEAR).  
98 J.J. Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter Between Asian and Western Thought 118 
(1997)  
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3. DAOIST AND ZEN CONCEPTS OF SELFHOOD
The Daoist and Zen concepts of selfhood flow naturally from the same basic 
outlook, social and/or historical conditions that produced Daoist metaphys-
ics in several respects.   First, in both Daoism and Zen, selfhood, like the 
Dao, is seen as something that can neither be purposefully sought nor ex-
pressed in words.  In 1974, Zen scholar Masao Abe participated on a discus-
sion  panel  at  a  seminar  on Zen Buddhism for  Christian  missionaries  in 
Kyoto.99  A member of the audience, identified in the transcript as “Father 
De Weirdt,” asked Abe whether he thought that the self was “nothing,” and 
if so, “what are we doing here in this world, both in the ontological and ac-
tual spheres of life?”100  Abe’s response and the following interchange illus-
trates just how far Daoist and Zen thought is from the world of cogito ergo 
sum:
Prof. Abe:  My counterquestion is this:  do you think that the human self 
is something?
Father De Weirdt:  I think so, Professor, I think so!
Prof. Abe: What is it who thinks of yourself as something?
Father De Weirdt: My consciousness of being something, a somebody. 
And I believe that people around me are real people, that this house is a real 
thing, that the universe is a real thing.  I am conscious of that in my mind.
Prof. Abe: What is it that has such a consciousness?
Father De Weirdt: The human being.
Prof. Abe:  Human being in general?
Father De Weirdt:  Each human being! It is difficult to say if it is up here 
in the head or in the heart—I don’t know.  But as a human being I have that 
consciousness.
Prof. Abe:  Who is talking about “I” as a human being—what has that 
consciousness?
Father De Weirdt:  Many people are talking about themselves.  Each in-
dividual being talks about himself and others.
Prof. Abe:  What is it that is talking about yourself and other people in 
that way? 
. . . 
99 Masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought, Chapter 9 n. 1, at 287.
100 Masao  Abe,  “Self  Awakening  and  Faith—Zen  and  Christianity,”  in  Zen  and  Western 
Thought 194 (1985).
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Father De Weirdt:  My own consciousness of myself and of the relation-
ship to others.
Prof. Abe:  May I ask you again, what is it that is talking about your own 
consciousness of yourself?
Father De Weirdt:  I would say that it is my personality.
Prof. Abe:  I am afraid, Father De Weirdt, you always objectify yourself 
when you talk about yourself or your own consciousness.  Whenever I ask 
you “What is it that is so talking?” you say that it is your consciousness, it is 
your own consciousness of yourself, your personality or so on. Thus you ob-
jectify your own consciousness, your own existence, your own self, and in 
that way you yourself move back step by step.  When you answered my 
questions in that way, you were always regressing, trying to present some-
thing more inner including your “self.” However, your true “Self” can never 
be  presented  in  that  way  because  it  is  always  standing  “behind”  your 
presentation, “behind” your regression…
In our thinking, we objectify everything including ourself and, in 
objectifying, we always regress…In such an endless regression we always 
miss our true Self, our true Subjectivity.  In this case, therefore, our under-
standing of the self and its relation to everything in the world does not in-
dicate the totality.  It becomes partial and does not reach the ultimate Real-
ity.  Through our thinking we can understand the self and its relation to the 
world only so far as they are objectified.  In order to reach ultimate Reality 
or the total understanding of Reality, we must go beyond thinking and ob-
jectification.101 
Because Daoism posits that all things emerged from the same Dao, “it  
becomes very difficult  to mark a dividing line  between ‘things’ and ‘the 
self,’”102 just as Daoism in general takes a holistic view of reality.  To the ex-
tent one draws distinctions between “I” and “not-I,” this is a tendency one 
seeks to overcome through practice.  Indeed, Zen appears to view ego as a 
burden peculiar to humanity; writes Masao Abe, 
To be human means to be an ego-self; to be an ego-self means to be cut  
off from both one’s self and one’s world; and to be cut off from one’s self and 
one’s world means to be in constant anxiety. This is the human predicament. 
101 Masao Abe, “Self Awakening and Faith—Zen and Christianity,” 195-96.
102 Kung-chuan Hsiao,  A History of Chinese Political Thought,  Vol.  I  302 (1979)(F.W. Mote,  
trans.).  
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The ego-self, split at the root into subject and object, is forever dangling over 
a bottomless abyss, unable to gain any footing.103
Daoism, similar to modern Western phenomenology, also recognizes no 
division between the body and the soul or spirit.104  The self is entirely phe-
nomenal, which also means, when coupled with the Daoist and Buddhist 
belief that there is nothing with a permanent and true nature, that there is 
no true permanent “selfhood.” 105  In traditional Japan, the principle of Musi 
or “denial of self” (derived from the word Mu, for “Nothingness,” and “si” 
meaning a sort of surface subjectivity) “seems to have been one of the most 
important values not only for critics and authors, but also for the majority of 
Japanese people.”106  In Japanese culture, “it is often said that Musi … is the 
best—but ‘hidden’ and difficult—way to learn fine arts, martial arts, and so 
on.  It is believed that if someone stops relying on superficial subjectivity or 
will, he can rely on these underlying, more powerful sources of energy … 
Mu is an ontological way to get the sources  of hidden power or the ‘true’ 
subjectivity.”107 
Where Daoism in its more religious forms speaks of immortality or the 
pursuit thereof, what is usually meant is not the “disembodied survival of 
the individual person”108 but a long (sometimes unusually long) and happy 
natural life.  
Indeed, the very term “immortality,” carrying as it does in the West the 
notion of disembodied survival  of  the individual  person,  may fail  to  do 
justice  to  the  Daoist  goal  of  ultimate  absorption  in  the  dao,  for  strictly 
speaking only the dao itself is immortal, all individuals being subject ulti-
mately to change and transformation…. Daoism offers us a radically trans-
formative paradigm which sees change as an ultimate property of nature, 
and as such stands in sharp contrast to typical yearnings in the Western reli-
gious and philosophical traditions for ultimate permanence and stasis.109
These concepts are quite far from the Kant/Weber/Habermas/Rawls vis-
ion of the autonomous self that Cohen finds so problematic for privacy the-
ory.  It should also be noted in this regard that Kant and Weber were both 
103 Masao Abe, “Zen and its Elucidation” in Zen and Western Thought 6-7 (1985).  
104 J.J. Clarke, 119. 
105 Masao Abe, “Zen, Buddhism and Western Thought,” in Zen and Western Thought, 92-93. 
106 Makoto Nakada and Takanori Tamura, Japanese Conceptions of Privacy: An Intercultural 
Perspective, Ethics and Information Technology (2005) 7:27-36, 31.  
107 Nakada and Tamura, 29. 
108 J.J. Clarke, 120.
109 J.J. Clarke, 120. 
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devout Christians.  Habermas is an atheist, as was Rawls (who asserted that 
he lost his Christian faith upon learning of the horrors of the Holocaust); 
nonetheless, all four of these philosophers were raised in the Christian faith, 
and in a culture in which the prevailing belief is that the most valuable as-
pect of one’s personhood is the soul, a non-corporeal entity whose perfec-
tion and immortality is achieved through its abstraction from bodily exist-
ence.  To the extent this religious grounding provided unspoken assump-
tions about personhood that informed their notions of an autonomous legal 
subject, these are assumptions that the Daoist tradition does not share. 
It is true that classical Daoist texts can occasionally seem consistent with 
the  Kant/Weber/Habermas/Rawls  view of  the  self,  with its  promotion  of 
rugged individualism, a sort of extreme libertarianism, and the practice of 
spending  extended  periods  seeking  enlightenment  in  Thoreau-like 
solitude.110  However, these aspects of classical Daoism reflect its political  
status in ancient China, and arose in part from a dichotomy the Zhuangzi 
created between the “natural” and the “artificial” that was later rejected.  To 
classical Daoists, everything that was the product of man was artificial, “ex-
ternal,” and hence, to be avoided.  This led Daoists to a political theory re-
garded as “the most thoroughgoing of all individualisms, ancient and mod-
ern, Chinese and foreign … and also the most extreme of libertarian philo-
sophies, ancient and modern, Chinese and foreign.”111  For the individual, 
classical Daoism recommended a life of simplicity, limited desires, and wu-
wei, a term that is generally translated into English as “non-action” but ac-
tually comes closer to meaning “acting without artificiality and arbitrari-
ness.”112  For governments and rulers, Zhuangzi took wu-wei a step further 
and introduced the concept of tsai yu, or “letting people alone.”113  Like 
Confucianism, Daoism posits that “the ideal state is one which has a sage as 
its head,” but unlike Confucianism, asserts that the duty of the sage ruler “is 
not to do things, but rather to undo or not to do at all.”114 Julia Ching finds 
Daoism “evocative of the ‘hippie’ movement of the 1960s”;115 a political the-
ory such as Zhuangzi’s renders freedom “not a means for guaranteeing the 
110 Kung-chuan Hsiao describes the Daodejing and Zhuangzi as “the most systematic example of 
egocentric thought of the pre-Ch’in era.  Kung-chuan Hsiao, 283.
111 Kung-chuan Hsiao, 316.
112 Fung Yu-Lan, 100-101.  
113 Kung-chuan Hsiao, 309. 
114 Fung Yu-Lan, 102.  
115 Julie Ching, Chinese Religions 99 (1993), quoted in J.J. Clarke, 35.
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growth of knowledge and human capacities,  but … in itself the ultimate 
goal.”116  Zhuangzi’s political theories “display unconditional confidence in 
the individual, but they hold unconditional contempt for organization.  For 
no matter whether they are good or bad, institutions and systems can con-
tribute nothing to the individual’s freedom.”117 
This  most  extreme version of Daoist  political  theory never developed 
into a real political movement, as anarchists tend to have a conceptual diffi-
culty with serving in positions of power within governments.118  After the 
collapse of the Ch’in Dynasty in 206 B.C., which for a time discredited both 
the Confucian and Legalist scholars with whom it had been associated, Dao-
ism was for a short period adopted as the predominant political theory.  But 
in order to actually hold political positions, Daoists “could no longer rely 
purely on the doctrine of taking no action.  Conseqeuently, they borrowed 
heavily  from  other  schools  to  meet  the  demands  introduced  by  these 
changed circumstances.”119 
In the third century A.D., a famous Commentary on the Zhuangzi fur-
ther  synthesized  Daoist  metaphysics  with  Confucian  political  theory.   It 
largely eliminated the distinction classical Daoism had drawn between the 
world of “Nature” and the “artificial” world of man, asserting that social 
phenomena were as much a part of “Nature” as anything else.120  This set 
the stage for a wholesale integration of Daoist metaphysics and Confucian-
ist views on social ordering and governance into neo-Confucianism, as de-
scribed above, and has resulted in a modern East Asian view of the self that  
is seamlessly integrated not only into a holistic view of nature, but also of 
society; in short, a “socially-situated self.”
Indeed, the Western-style self is virtually a figment of the imagination to 
the  East  Asian.   As philosopher  Hu Shih  writes,  “In  the  Confucian  hu-
man-centered philosophy man cannot exist alone; all action must be in the 
116 Kung-chuan Hsiao, 318. 
117 Kung-chuan Hsiao, 317.  
118 As  Kung-chuan Hsiao  explains,  “For  an  individualism  to  develop  into  a  revolutionary 
democratic thought system, it must possess an attitude not only positive with regard to the  
individual,  but also not negative  with regard to society and government.   That against 
which it is in protest cannot be all institutions as such, but only those institutions at the time 
confronting it which fail to satisfy people.” Kung-chuan Hsiao, 316.
119 Kung-chuan Hsiao, 550.  
120 Fung Yu-Lan, quoting the Commentary as saying, “There is nothing which is not natural…
Peace or disorder, success or failure…are all the product of nature, not of man.”  Fung Yu-
Lan, at 223.  The Commentary on the Zhuangzi might have been written by either Kuo 
Hsiang or Hsian Hsiu, or may be a synthesis of the work of both scholars.  Fung Yu-Lan, at 
220.  
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form of interaction between man and man.”  The person always exists with-
in settings—in particular situations where there are particular people with 
whom one has relationships of a particular kind—and the notion that there 
can be attributes or actions that are not conditioned on social circumstances 
is alien to the Asian mentality…. To the Westerner, it makes sense to speak 
of a person as having attributes that are independent of circumstances or 
particular  personal  relations.   This  self—this  bounded,  impermeable  free 
agent—can move from group to group and setting to setting without signi-
ficant alteration.  But for the Easterner (and for many other peoples to one 
degree  or  another),  the  person is  connected,  fluid,  and conditional.   As 
philosopher Donald Munro put it, East Asians understand themselves “in 
terms of their relation to the whole, such as the family, society, Tao Principle, 
or Pure Consciousness.”  The person participates in a set of relationships 
that make it possible to act and purely independent behavior is usually not 
possible or really even desirable.121
A somewhat morbid illustration of this difference in East-West thinking 
can be found in media responses to individuals who go on homicidal ram-
pages.  In 1991, a Chinese physics student at the University of Michigan 
shot his faculty adviser, several bystanders, and then himself after failing to 
obtain an academic job.122  Two of Richard Nisbett’s students, Michael Moris 
and Kaiping Peng, noticed that in the Western press, the murderer was de-
scribed as having psychological problems (i.e., had a “very bad temper” or 
was “darkly disturbed”), whereas the Chinese media focused on the stu-
dent’s social problems and broader social context (using phrases like “did 
not get along well with his adviser,” “rivalry with slain student,” “isolation 
from  Chinese  community,”  and  “availability  of  guns  in  the  United 
States”).123  Moris and Peng began studying press coverage of similar incid-
ents,  involving  both  Asian  and  American  perpetrators,  and  a  pattern 
emerged:  The Western coverage would always focus on whether certain in-
nate, static psychological attributes had caused the murderer to act as he 
did, while the Eastern coverage would always describe situational factors.124 
Makoto Nakada, who teaches Information and Media Studies in Tsukuba, 
Japan, observed a similar phenomenon among his students in response to a 
2004 homicide in nearby Tutiura, in which a 28-year-old killed his parents 
121 Nisbett, 50-51.  
122 Nisbett, 111.
123 Nisbett, 111-12. 
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and oldest sister.  A leading newspaper published extensive and intimate 
details about the entire family, its interrelationships, and even a map of the 
household in which the murders had taken place, which became the topic of 
several class discussions.  Most of Nakada’s students insisted that “this kind 
of information is very important in order to know the ‘truth’ of this case.  
Some students explicitly said that this kind of news report provides them 
with frameworks through which they can share certain aspects of the mean-
ing of this tragedy.”125  Just as East Asians tend to understand objects holist-
ically and primarily in relation to other objects, it seems that they also seek 
to understand human motivation and behavior primarily in relation to oth-
er humans.
A more  commonplace  illustration  of  the  socially-situated  self  can  be 
found in how East Asians and Americans describe themselves.  Japanese 
people surveyed by Nisbett’s colleagues in one study found it difficult to de-
scribe  themselves  without  specifying  a  particular  context  (at  work,  with 
friends, etc.), and were much more likely than Americans to make reference 
to social roles or to other people (e.g., “I am John’s friend” or “I cook dinner 
with my sister”).   By contrast, the Americans surveyed had no difficulty de-
scribing themselves generally, but tended to be “stumped” when asked who 
they are in a specific context, insisting simply, “I am what I am.”126  Another 
study indicates that Americans are much more likely than Koreans to be-
lieve that “someone’s personality is something about them that they can’t 
change very much”;  according to the study, Koreans find personalities to be 
more malleable.127  Notes Nisbett, “[t]his is consistent with the long Western 
tradition of regarding the world as being largely static and the long Eastern 
tradition of viewing the world as constantly changing.”128  It is also consist-
124 Nisbett, 112-13.  Moris and Peng then gathered a group of Chinese and American students 
and asked them questions about such murders; specifically, whether they thought that the 
murders might not have occurred if circumstances had been different (for example, “if Lu 
had received a job” or “if McIlvane had many friends and relatives in Royal Oak”).   The 
Chinese were much more likely than the Americans to respond that the murders would not 
have occurred, whereas the Americans, “because of their conviction that it was the mur-
derer’s long-established dispositions that were the key to his rampage, felt it was likely that  
the killings would have occurred regardless of whether circumstances had been different.” 
Id., 113-14. 
125 Makoto Nakada and Takanori Tamura, Japanese Conceptions of Privacy: An Intercultural 
Perspective, Ethics and Information Technology (2005) 7:27-36, 28. 
126 Nisbett, 53.  
127 Nisbett, 120.
128 Nisbett, 120.
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ent  with  the  Kant/Weber/Habermas/Rawls  view  of  the  autonomous  and 
largely static self that informs Western privacy theory.
The Daoist and Zen concepts of self, as reflected in modern Asian self-
concepts, also influence feelings of both control and the necessity of control. 
East Asians,  as compared to their Western counterparts,  feel  both less in 
control and less distressed about their inability to control situations; they 
tend to cope with situations by adjusting themselves to them.  For Americ-
ans of European descent, the feeling of being in control of one’s own life 
tends to be “strongly associated with mental health,” to a much greater de-
gree than for either Asians or Asian Americans.129  This may well explain 
why “notice and choice” has been such a prominent staple of privacy regu-
lation in the United States, despite copious evidence that Americans are not 
actually reading privacy notices and don’t really have effective choices with 
regard to privacy preferences.130  Americans are so convinced that the world 
is composed of discrete objects that  can be controlled by individuals that 
they are more susceptible than East Asians to being satisfied with an “illu-
sion of control,” a term defined by social psychologist Ellen Langer as “an 
expectation that personal success is  greater than the objective probability 
would warrant.”131  In one of her studies that illustrates this principle, 
Langer approached people in an office building and asked whether they 
would like to buy a lottery ticket for a dollar.  If the person said yes, she  
then either handed the person a lottery ticket or fanned out a bunch of them 
and asked the person to choose one.  Two weeks later, she approached all 
those who had bought a ticket, saying that lots of people wanted to buy a 
ticket, but there were none left.  Would the person be willing to sell the tick-
et back, and if so, what would the price be?  On average, the people she had 
handed the ticket to were willing to sell the ticket back for about two dol-
lars, but the people who had been allowed to choose their tickets held out 
for almost nine! 132
129 Nisbett, 97, citing Sastry J. and Ross, C.E. (1998) “Asian ethnicity and the sense of personal  
control,” Social Psychology Quarterly 61, 101-120. 
130 U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in An Era of Rapid Change:  
A Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policymakers, December 2010, available online 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf, at iii and 26-28. 
131 Nisbett, 100, citing Langer, Ellen (1975) “The Illusion of Control,” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 56, 239-244.
132 Nisbett, 100-101, citing Langer, E. (1975) “The Illusion of Control,” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 56, 239-244. 
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Despite all these differences, however, the notion of the individual self is 
not alien to East Asian culture (setting aside for the time being the modern 
influence of Western individualistic culture, which will be discussed in fur-
ther detail below).  As Hazel Rose Markus and Shinobu Kitayama point out, 
there is an element of selfishness in interdependence:
[I] in many cases, responsive and cooperative actions are exercised only 
when there is  a  reasonable assurance of the “good-intentions” of others, 
namely their commitment to engage in reciprocal interaction and mutual 
support.  Clearly, interdependent selves do not attend to the needs, desires,  
and goals of all others.  Attention to others is not indiscriminate; it is highly 
selective and will  be most characteristic  of relationships with “in-group” 
members.  These are others with whom one shares a common fate, such as  
family members or members of the same lasting social group, such as the 
work group.  Out-group members are typically treated quite differently and 
are unlikely to experience either the advantages or disadvantages of inter-
dependence. 133
Moreover, they add, 
[a]n interdependent view of self does not result in a merging of self and 
other, nor does it imply that one must always be in the company of others to 
function effectively, or that  people do not  have a sense of themselves as 
agents who are the origins of their own actions.  On the contrary, it takes a 
high degree of self-control  and agency to effectively adjust oneself to vari-
ous interpersonal contingencies.134
To truly understand the Daoist and Zen concept of the self requires dis-
pensing with Western concepts of logic, and specifically, the Aristotelian syl-
logism that insists on everything being “A” or “not-A.”  Daoism teaches, in 
typical paradoxical fashion, that one must lose oneself in order to find it.  135 
Both the interaction between Masao Abe and Father de Weirdt discussed 
above and the Japanese practice of Musi indicate that what is sought in Zen 
133 Hazel Rose Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self: Implications for Cogni-
tion, Emotion, and Motivation, Psychological Review 1991, Vol. 98, No. 2, 224-253, at 229.  
134 Markus and Kitayama, at 228.  
135 Wing-Tsit Chan, 24. 
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is an abandonment of a superficial or surface “subjectivity” in favor of “the 
real Subjectivity,” in which one’s interconnectedness and independence are 
both realized simultaneously.  This also appears to be the goal of Naikan, 
the form of psychotherapy developed in Japan, which, unlike Western ther-
apies, emphasizes recognizing one’s relatedness and interdependence.  Ac-
cording to anthropologist Chikao Ozawa-de Silva, who underwent a week 
of Naikan therapy, Naikan 
does not negate individuality and psychological  independence (in the 
sense of being one’s own person); it may actually be a precondition for it … 
According to Buddhist thought, what makes something a distinct individu-
al  entity with its  own characteristics is  precisely its  web of relationships 
with other entities; what makes a person who he or she is, is all the relation-
ships he or she has with other persons and phenomena.  Remove all those 
relationships—to nature, to one’s parents, friends, workplace, family, hob-
bies—and what person is left?  Put them back, and one has a completely 
distinctive individual. Thus there is no conflict between individuality and 
interdependence.136
Or, as the Chinese Zen master Ch’ing yuan Wei-hsin explains it:
Thirty years ago, before I began the study of Zen, I said, “Mountains are 
mountains, waters are waters.”
After I got an insight into the truth of Zen through the instruction of 
a good master, I said, “Mountains are not mountains, waters are not wa-
ters.”
But  now,  having  attained  the  abode  of  final  rest  [that  is, 
Awakening], I say, “Mountains are really mountains, waters are really wa-
ters.”137
4. EAST ASIAN CONCEPTS OF PRIVACY
A Western reader might be poised to conclude at this point that a society in 
which  Daoist, Zen and/or neo-Confucian notions of selfhood predominate 
would have a more collectivistic social structure, which in turn would result 
in generally less appreciation for privacy than is typically found in most 
136 Chikao Ozawa-de Silva, 438-39. 
137 Quoted in Masao Abe, “Zen and its Elucidation,” in Zen and Western Thought, 4.  
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Western cultures.  This would have serious ramifications for Julie Cohen’s 
scholarship,  since  an  embrace  of  the  postmodernist  scholarship  she  en-
dorses, with its very similar conceptualizations of the self as interdependent 
and socially-situated, would presumably lead to a world with far less pri-
vacy.  Fortunately for Cohen’s scholarship, however, the studies of East Asi-
an concepts of privacy undertaken thus far show nothing of the sort.  While  
such studies are still very much in their infancy, there are no indications 
either that there is a consistent East Asian view of privacy, or that the degree 
of collectivism present in a society has any bearing upon the value it places 
on  privacy.   Despite  numerous  protestations  from  Western  and  Eastern 
scholars alike that “East Asia has no tradition of privacy,” or “they don’t 
even have a word for privacy,”138 East Asian concepts of privacy easily rival 
their Western counterparts in historical depth, cultural breadth, nuance and 
psychological complexity.139  
138 See, e.g., Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword 288 (1946)(“Because there is 
little privacy in a Japanese community, too, it is no fantasy that ‘the world’ knows practic-
ally everything he does and can reject him if it disapproves”); Margaret Mead, Coming of  
Age in Samoa (1928), p. 145, 216 (suggesting that, because Samoan culture had no sense of 
privacy, there is “no sense of shame” and “none of the facts of sex…are regarded as unfit for  
children”).  The notion that China, Japan or other East Asian countries don’t have a “word” 
for privacy other than neologisms adopted from Western terms is a bit of a red herring.    As 
Bonnie McDougall points out, 
Although  most  anthropologists  have  now  rejected  it,  the  Sapir-Whorf  hypothesis  that 
thought is shaped by language also lingers in Western thinking about non-Western societ-
ies.  According to this hypothesis, the concept of privacy in one language community will 
be uniform within and unique to that community; and since the terminology for privacy is-
sues differs considerably from one language to another, cross-cultural studies compare dif-
ferent entities.  This argument tends to be used selectively.  Very few English speakers, for 
instance, would want to claim that in European countries with privacy terminologies that 
differ from English (e.g., the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland) there are radically different  
concepts of privacy, but it is quite commonly claimed (in the extreme form of this argument) 
that the Chinese language lacks an equivalent vocabulary for privacy and that therefore 
Chinese people do not have a sense of privacy.
Bonnie S. McDougall, “Particulars and Universals: Studies on Chinese Privacy,” in Bonnie S. 
McDougall and Anders Hansson, eds., Chinese Concepts of Privacy 4 (2002).
Moreover, while it is true that Japan has adopted the paronym puraibashii for “privacy,”  
this must be considered against the backdrop of a longstanding Japanese tendency to “im-
port[] external concepts into law and social appearances while either using them as a mask 
for continued traditional practices or misunderstanding their original conception and pro-
ducing a new Japanese custom with the same name as the external concept but a different 
meaning…”  Andrew A. Adams, Kiyoshi Murata, and Yohko Orito, “The Japanese Sense of  
Information Privacy,” AI & Soc. (2009) 24:327-341, at 327.
139 Accord Andrew A. Adams, Kiyoshi Murata, and Yohko Orito, “The Japanese Sense of In-
formation Privacy, AI & Soc. (2009) 24:327-341, at 330 (“…rather than being the poor cousin 
of  the Western sense of  information privacy,  Japanese social  interactions and linguistics 
demonstrate a nuanced awareness of flexing boundaries of information flow…”).
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For the Western reader to contemplate this counter-intuitive proposition 
requires dispensing once and for all with the notion that privacy is an ex-
pression of the individual’s need for separation from others.  In this regard, 
it is helpful to review the privacy definition developed by Irwin Altman, 
one of two privacy scholars (the other being philosopher Julie Inness) whose 
work has been found generally the most applicable and helpful for cross-
cultural analysis by China scholars.  As noted in the Introduction, Altman 
regards privacy, not as a form of enforced isolation, but as “an interpersonal 
boundary regulation process by which a person or group regulates interac-
tion with others” and which “permits people to be open to others on some 
occasions and to be closed off from interaction at other times.”140  This is a 
departure from traditional Western ways of thinking about privacy in that it 
emphasizes  that  “privacy means  changing boundary control,  not  merely 
‘keeping out’ others or shutting off  stimulation.”141  Altman portrays the 
dialectical interaction of openness and closedness with a yin and yang sym-
bol, and he asserts that the idea of changing accessibility draws upon the 
ancient  Chinese  notion  of  yin/yang  as  “seeming  opposites”  that  “lend 
meaning  to  each  other,”  like  “harmony  and  conflict,  opposite  processes 
[that] provide a unity to social relationships,” and whose balance is “in a 
constant state of change” (a concept that he draws from the Yijing).142  
A notion of privacy that emphasizes its fluid and inter-relational aspects 
can just as easily be recognized and appreciated within a culture that is fo-
cused on interpersonal harmony, as by those who are primarily concerned 
with individual autonomy and political liberty.  Indeed, it is inconceivable 
that any culture that values modesty, etiquette and “saving face”—cultural 
attributes  strongly  associated  with  East  Asia—would  not  also  value  the 
mechanisms that allow its members to regulate their relative openness and 
closedness with one another.  Anthropologist Stephen Feuchtwang suggests 
that privacy operates as a facet of “the taboo on incest,” insofar as it regu-
lates what types of intimacy and disclosure are allowable between genera-
tions and siblings.143  Privacy can be regarded as a duty just as easily as it 
can be considered a “right”; the wearing of the hijab or other forms of veil-
ing in contemporary Arab and South Asian cultures, for example, seems to 
140 Irwin Altman and Martin Chemers, eds., Culture and Environment 75 (1980).  
141 Altman, 78.  
142 Altman, 78.  
143 Stephan Feuchtwang, “Reflections on Privacy in China,” 218.
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embody both privileges and obligations simultaneously.144  Refraining in 
certain social settings from revealing too much, either visually or verbally, 
can be grounded in either self-respect or respect for others.145  It can be op-
pressive, or liberating. 
Altman’s  work  also  prompts  a  greater  open-mindedness  towards  the 
variety of mechanisms that are available to regulate interpersonal boundar-
ies.  Feuchtwang refers to privacy boundaries as “thresholds” and notes that 
they can be “made out of convention, ritual, rhetoric and time as well as 
doors and windows.” 146  Altman describes a variety of verbal, nonverbal 
and “paraverbal” behaviors that can be used to communicate our desire for 
openness or closedness, such as “use of a ‘cool’ or ‘warm’ way of speaking…
nodding  or  heads,  smiling,  opening  our  arms…[or]  fidgeting  with  our 
clothing…and looking at our watches.”147  He also notes that, in some cul-
tures in which dwellings offer very little physical privacy, as in Javanese cul-
ture, where walls are thin and “friends and acquaintances…wander freely 
in and out of houses,” politeness, soft-spokenness and elaborate decorum 
144 Some contemporary Muslim women report  that  going outside without a head covering 
would make them feel “completely naked.”  Quoted in John R. Bowen, Why the French 
Don’t Like Headscarves 77 (2007).  Fadwa El Guindi asserts that “veiling in contemporary 
Arab culture is largely about identity, largely about privacy—of space and body.”  Fadwa El  
Guindi, Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance xvii (1999).  She asserts that those who see 
veiling as oppressive are viewing the practice through a Christian lens, noting that, while 
“[b]oth Islam and Christianity provide moral systems to restrain improper and disorderly 
behaviour that threatens the sociomoral order,” “Christianity chose the path of desexualiz-
ing the worldly environment; Islam of regulating the social order while accepting its sexual-
ized environment.”  Id., 31.  She further argues that veiling and other mechanisms designed 
to create a separate sphere for women constitutes a “source of support and even power,” 
Id., at 32 (quoting Makhlouf, 1979:25), and that in general, the Islamic construction of space  
“enables women and men to enjoy privacy and be in public.”  Id. at 77-78.  In several pas-
sages reminiscent of Bentham’s Panopticon, El Guindi illustrates how the transparency of 
facial veils enables veiled women to see without being seen, which is ultimately empower-
ing.  Id. at 94, 102.  
145 Accord El Guindi, who quotes a man from the Awlad ‘Ali culture of North Africa as stating 
that women tahashham [veil] “from respect for their tribe, their husband, and themselves.” 
El Guindi, 90.  More familiar to Americans is the expression “TMI” (too much information), 
an expression indicating that someone has revealed information about himself or herself 
that makes the recipient of the information uncomfortable.  See, e.g., “Dealbreaker: the TMI 
Guy,” Nov. 17, 2009, available online at http://www.thefrisky.com/post/246-dealbreaker-the-
tmi-guy/;  Elizabeth  Bernstein,  “How  Facebook Ruins  Friendships,”  Wall  Street  Journal,  
Aug.  25,  2009,  available  at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204660604574370450465849142.html.   As 
noted above, Markus and Kitayama observe that,  in interdependent cultures, “it takes a 
high degree of self-control and agency to effectively adjust oneself to various interpersonal  
contingencies.”  This “[a]gentic exercise of control” is “directed primarily to the inside and 
to those inner attributes, such as desires, personal goals, and private emotions, that can dis-
turb the harmonious equilibrium of interpersonal transaction.”  Markus and Kitayama, 228. 
This would seem to make privacy all the more important for an individual’s proper func-
tioning in an interdependent society. 
146 Feuchtwang, “Reflections on Privacy in China,” 229.
147 Altman, 79. 
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form a different sort of barrier.148  In cultures in which facial veiling is pre-
valent and serves as a “literal boundary-regulation mechanism,” such as in 
the Tuareg culture of Mali, Niger, and the Sudan (in which men veil as well 
as women), “the veil does not remain in one position but is ever so slightly 
raised and lowered to fit various social relationships,” and people are “very 
sensitive to slight eye movements and to shifts of body posture as interac-
tion progresses.”149
Julie Inness also differentiates between the functions, contents, mechan-
isms,  and values of privacy,  a  framework that  has  generally been found 
helpful by China scholars in engaging in a cross-cultural analysis of privacy. 
150  What such scholars have found is that while “[c]ross-cultural comparis-
ons between instances and mechanisms of privacy (for example, the space 
observed by implicit consent between people in a queue) focus on differ-
ences in expression or awareness of privacy…more comprehensive discus-
sions  of  privacy  in  terms of  functions  and values  tend to  reveal  shared 
ground.” 151  Moreover, privacy can be equally valued in two different cul-
tures,  but  for  entirely  different  reasons;  “in  assessing  how a  culture  (or 
groups within a culture) values privacy, we might ask whether it is because 
it promotes desired ends, such as intimate relations, self-respect and free-
dom from the scrutiny of other, or as an end in itself.  It may well be the 
case that privacy is valued for other reasons by contemporary Chinese urb-
anites.”152 
Inness also, like Altman, views privacy more as a matter of control than 
of separation, her primary objection to the separation-based account of pri-
vacy being that “it portrays privacy as essentially individualistic.”  Specific-
ally, she finds preposterous the implication that  “only the individual who is 
fully separated from others with respect to these aspects of her life will have 
full privacy.”153  Such a view “makes it impossible to experience shared pri-
148 Altman, 88-89 (citing Geertz).
149 Altman, 92.  Sharma has made similar observations of women in Ghanyari, in North India,  
“who know how to draw the veil across the face in a dozen different ways to denote a 
dozen different degrees of respect or disrespect.  I have seen the veil used insolently.”  U. 
Sharma, “Women and their Affines: The Veil as a Symbol of Separation,” Man 13: 218-33, at 
224 (1978)(quoted in El Guindi, at 98).  
150 See, e.g., discussion of Inness in Robin Visser, “Privacy and its Ill Effects in Post-Mao Urban 
Fiction,” 173.
151 McDougall, “Particulars and Universals,” 6 (citing Irwin Altman, “Privacy as an Interper-
sonal Boundary Process,” in Human Ethology, ed. Mario von Cranach et al. (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press), pp. 95-132, esp. p. 131).  
152 Robin Visser, “Privacy and its Ill Effects in Post-Mao Urban Fiction,” 173.
153 Julie Inness, Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation 45 (1992). 
2013] Lara A. Ballard: The Dao of Privacy 145
vacy” and leads to the conclusion that “I lose privacy when I willingly in-
vite a close friend into my home, when I initiate mutual sexual activity with 
another, and when I allow a trusted friend to read a personal letter.”154  
Indeed, once the gauzy and distorting veil of Western individualism is 
lifted, privacy can be revealed in all of its universalist glory as an essential 
aspect of the human condition.  The inscriptions on bronze vessels, called 
jinwen, dating from the pre-Ch’in era (16th century to 481 B.C.) indicate that 
they were used in conjunction with ancestral worship and were considered 
to be “private belongings” of a particular clan.  They were “concealed from 
free  public  access.” 155  This  indicates  a  Chinese  differentiation  between 
gong and si (terms that are analogous to the English terms “public” and 
“private” in several respects)156 comparable to the classic Aristotelian  dis-
tinction between the public sphere of politics,  or polis,  and the domestic 
sphere, or oikos. “Contrary to the widespread assumption among sinolo-
gists that there is a ‘seamless unity’ between public and private life in tradi-
tional China (in distinction to a supposed separation of public and private 
in Western society), it is more appropriate to speak of public and private in 
both Chinese and Western societies as placed on a spectrum with a large 
154 Inness, 45-46. 
155 Khayutina, “Studying the Private Sphere,” 86-91.
156 “Like the English “public/private” dichotomy, “the gong/si dichotomy can map onto either 
government/ non-government spheres, or to the sphere of the collective (including govern-
ment and also most cooperative forms) and the sphere of the family and individual.” Zar-
row, “The Origins of Modern Chinese Concepts of Privacy,” 132.  According to Khayutina, 
the word si could have had any of the following meanings in ancient Chinese:
1. Private, particular, as opposed to gong [communal](identified with the interests 
of the state and society as a whole).  A servant or an official of someone other  
than the head of the state.
2. Selfish, partial.  In one’s own interests.  Without authorization.
3. Secret,  clandestine, private.  Illicit, especially used of bribery and smuggling.  
Without witness.
4. Private, particular, proper.  Property of private persons or groups (jia si)[famili-
al property].  Siren [members of a clan, relatives, friends; servants [p. 84], be-
longed to families of great seigneurs.   Brother-in-law.]
5. To love or favour [someone] particularly.  To consider [something] as one’s own.
6. One’s everyday clothes.
7. In one’s mind.
8. To urinate.
9.  Genitals.
Khayutina, “Studying the Private Sphere,” 83-84.  The Japanese language appears to use the 
terms ohtake and watakusi in ways roughly analogous to gong and si.  See Makoto Nakada 
and Takanori Tamura, Japanese Conceptions of Privacy: An Intercultural Perspective, Ethics 
and Information Technology (2005) 7:27-36, at 32-33.
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shared area poorly defined by fuzzy borders.”157  And at least as early as the 
Tang dynasty (618-907 A.D.),  literature and poetry celebrated withdrawal 
from public office and contentment in private or family life, suggesting “an 
early date for male consciousness as an emotional or interior need.”158
Certainly,  the  concept  of  secrecy  is  well  established in  China and Ja-
pan.159  To be sure, there is a distinction to be drawn between secrecy and 
privacy.  Carol Warren and Barbara Lislett describe privacy as “consensual,” 
and intended to protect behavior that is “socially legitimated and seen as 
nonthreatening to  others,”  whereas  secrecy  is  nonconsensual;  “the  beha-
viours it protects are seen as illegitimate and as involving the interests of 
the excluded.”160  However, in some instances, privacy and secrecy protect 
the same sorts of knowledge as a form of “guarded but known treasure,” 
the existence of which may be acknowledged, but the open revelation of 
which would “put this kind of knowledge in danger of dilution and defile-
ment.”161 This may be particularly the case with regard to the knowledge 
base of Daoists  and Chinese  doctors  whose textual  knowledge is  only  a 
guide to practice, the real knowledge base being “an embodied and hidden 
knowledge,  revealed in  the performance of treatment or of  ritual  that  is 
mysteriously effective.”162   Writes Feuchtwang, 
The location of the Daoist’s effect is not just a body.  It is also a place, the 
altar space for ascetic disciplines…At this spot the Daoist adjusts and har-
monises the relation of that place, through his body, to the inner order of the 
157 Bonnie McDougall, “Privacy in Modern China,” History Compass 2 (2004) AS 097, 1-8, at 
n.16.  
158 McDougall, “Particulars and Universals,” 16.
159 The August Moon festival, during which round, palm-sized “moon cakes” are traditionally 
served,  became instrumental  to  the overthrow of the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty in 1368, 
when the planners of the revolution distributed secret messages to their cohorts that were 
baked inside the cakes. (many exist online).  In Japanese the word for secret is himitsu.  
“Kigyoo himitsu are what Japanese companies strive to keep from one another—‘industrial 
secrets.’” Masahiko Mizutani, James Dorsey, and James H. Moore, “The internet and Japan-
ese conception of privacy,” Ethics and Information Technology 6: 121-128, at 122 (2004).
160 Carol Warren and Barbara Laslett,  “Privacy and Secrecy:  A Conceptual Comparison,” in 
Secrecy:  A Cross-Cultural Perspective, ed. Stanton K. Tefft (1980), pp. 25-34, quoted in Bon-
nie McDougall, “Functions and Values of Privacy in the Correspondence Between Lu Xun 
and Xu Guangping, 1925-1929,” in McDougall and Hansson, eds., Chinese Concepts of Pri -
vacy 150-51 (2002).
161 Stephan Feuchtwang, “Reflections on Privacy in China,” 215.
162 Stephan Feuchtwang, “Reflections on Privacy in China,” in McDougall and Hansson, eds.,  
Chinese  Concepts  of  Privacy  214  (2002)  (citing  Kristopher  Schipper,  The  Daoist  Body 
(1993)).  
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universe.  To reveal exactly the location of the head of the dragon of a territ-
ory is to risk malicious damage to it and therefore all who dwell in it.163
This  sort  of  reverence  for  certain  types  of  knowledge  in  traditional 
Chinese Culture applies to sexual intimacy as well, and is reflected in tradi-
tions relating to separation of the sexes that date back at least to the Con-
fucian Book of Rites.164  The relegation of women to the private sphere dur-
ing the Song Dynasty (960-1279) was probably more focused on ensuring 
that women “did not intrude into the men’s sphere”  than on protecting wo-
men’s dignity.165 In Imperial China, “[t]he siting of privacy in women’s quar-
ters and women’s bodies corresponds to the belief that women are closer to 
nature than men (i.e., ‘nature’ as distinct from man-made ‘culture’) and by 
further implication more often (or in more bodily parts) polluted.”166  Non-
etheless, “not all men could enter the spaces allocated to women,”  167 and 
the very existence of such a private sphere indicates an appreciation of pri-
vacy for intimate couples.  During the Song Dynasty, “[t]he emotional at-
tachments  between  husband  and  wife  were  private,  and  few  writers  of 
either sex expressed personal feelings about their own marriages in literary 
or  biographical  writings.   Sexual  intercourse between husband and wife 
was even more private; while gentry men wrote about their sexual experi-
ences with courtesans they did not write about their wives and only rarely 
about their concubines.”168
163 Stephan Feuchtwang, “Reflections on Privacy in China,” in McDougall and Hansson, eds.,  
Chinese  Concepts  of  Privacy  214  (2002)  (citing  Kristopher  Schipper,  The  Daoist  Body 
(1993)).  
164 The Book of Rites calls for the “separation of male and female.”  Ssu-ma Kuang, in an elab-
oration of this rule in his work “Miscellaneous Proprieties for Managing the Family,” stated 
that “[i]n housing there should be a strict demarcation between the inner and outer parts, 
with a door separating them.  The two parts should share neither a well, a washroom, nor a 
privy…During the day, the men do not stay in their private rooms nor the women go bey-
ond the inner door without good reason.  A woman who has to leave the inner quarters 
must cover her face (for example, with a veil).  Men who walk around at night must hold a  
candle.”  Quoted in Patricia Buckley Ebrey, The Inner Quarters: Marriage and the Lives of  
Chinese Women in the Sung Period 23-24 (1993).  
165 Ebrey, 24. Chu Hsi opined that “Men correctly establish themselves on the outside and are  
the  rulers  of  states  and  families.   Therefore,  when  they  are  wise  they  can  establish 
states….Beautiful and talented women, by contrast, are evil omens, for through talking too 
much they can get things started on the road to disaster.”  Quoted in Ebrey, at 25.  As Furth 
notes, “[t]he privacy of sex, seemingly fundamental, may be understood by both women 
and men as important to their human dignity, but its cultural elaborations mark complex 
hierarchies of class and gender, hierarchies imposed by the socially-authorized gaze judging 
honor and shame.” Furth, “Solitude, Silence and Concealment,” 37.  It should also be noted 
that the exclusion of women from the public sphere is typical of many traditional societies,  
including that of medieval Europe; see McDougall, “Particulars and Universals,” 11. 
166 McDougall, “Particulars and Universals,” 10. 
167 McDougall, “Particulars and Universals,” 10. 
168 McDougall, “Particulars and Universals,” 12.
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There is also an evident appreciation for seclusion, dating at least to the 
Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), and experienced both spatially and temporally. 
In the households of Ming Dynasty nobility, the marital bedroom was both 
“the active centre of a woman’s home life”  169 and “the site of a man’s social 
duty to beget heirs”; consequently, men were encouraged to keep a separate 
studio or study that contained a bed or couch, in which they could not only 
study but sleep alone in order to “conserve their seminal qi” 170 (energy, or 
life force).  In the late Ming, various meditative techniques proliferated, in-
cluding several Daoist versions of nei dan (inner alchemy), a prerequisite 
for which was “a fudi [blessed site] in a secluded spot naturally configured 
to gather harmonious qi influences.” 171  Learned women pursued such en-
deavors as well as men, as is evidenced by women poets of the period, al-
though they were far less likely than men to have access to a physical space 
of solitude (unless, perhaps, they were willing to make the same sacrifices 
as Sun Pu-Erh, discussed in the Introduction).  
For those women and men—the majority, certainly—who did not have 
the luxury of places to retreat to, introspection was possible during quiet 
hours especially at night and early morning (a favourite prescribed time for 
meditation as well).  Because others need not even be aware of these activit-
ies,  or to license them, such privacy of moments could be understood as 
stolen.172
East Asian studies of privacy do underscore the fact that the individual 
is  not the only conceivable unit  of privacy.   This is  not news to Western 
scholarship—Alan Westin defined privacy in 1967 as “the claim of individu-
als, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to 
what extent information about them is communicated to others”173—but it 
becomes more evident in certain East Asian contexts.  Khayutina’s study of 
bronze jinwen indicates that, in China, the unit of privacy could be as large 
as a clan, in the sense that “ritual observances are…confined to clansmen 
(with rare exceptions for non-clansmen or friends).”174  It was often the case, 
in traditional Japan as well as China, that there was little or no privacy with-
169 Furth, “Solitude, Silence and Concealment,” 40.
170 Furth, “Solitude, Silence and Concealment,” 40-41.
171 Furth, “Solitude, Silence and Concealment,” 47-48.
172 Furth, “Solitude, Silence and Concealment,” 50-52 (citing Maureen Robertson, “Gendered 
Landscapes” (Paper presented to the panel “Nature, Culture, Text: Siting Feminine Values 
in Imperial China,” Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, March 2001).  
173 Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom 7 (1967)(emphasis added).  
174 McDougall, “Particulars and Universals,” 22.
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in members of a family, but that information flows outside the family unit 
were strictly controlled.175  Illnesses, particularly those related to fertility, 
“aroused concern for the household as a social unit, proportionate to the 
significance of individual members to its prosperity and continuity, in keep-
ing with the Confucian adage that one’s body belongs not to oneself but to 
the family”;176 to this day, there are sensitivities regarding medical informa-
tion that might reflect poorly on one’s family.177 
As in Western culture, the designation of the family as the demarcation 
line between “public” and “private” can have rather drastic consequences 
for  individual family members (particularly women),  depending on who 
serves as the family’s spokesperson. An exasperated Chinese doctor making 
house calls in the 1640s complained, 
If you ask about daixia [vaginal discharge] the doctor is in danger; if you 
don’t ask, the patient is in danger.  However, if you do ask, the sick woman 
speaks to her maid and her maid speaks to the master.  Before the master  
says a word his face is crimson, and when he does speak his language is  
roundabout.178
Social etiquette is also quite visible in traditional Japanese culture as a 
mechanism  for  obtaining  privacy.   Japan  has  a  longstanding  tradition 
175 Accord Lü Yao-Huai, “Privacy and Data Privacy Issues in Contemporary China,” Ethics and 
Information Technology (2005) 7:7-15, at 14 (“…many Chinese still  think that matters of 
shame within the family should not be made public.  At the same time, they are also in-
clined to think there is no privacy within the family—that is to say, there is nothing that 
should be hushed up between husband and wife, and the parents are thought to have a 
right  to  know everything about  their  sons  and daughters (at  least,  as  long as  they are 
minors and not adults”); Francis L.K. Hsu, Americans and Chinese: Passage to Difference 
(3rd Edition, 1981; originally published 1953) (“Within the Chinese home…privacy hardly 
exists at all, except between members of the opposite sexes who are not spouses.  Chinese 
children, even in homes which have ample room, often share the same chambers with their 
parents until they reach adolescence.  Not only do parents have freedom of action with ref-
erence to the children’s belongings, but the youngsters can also use the possessions of the 
parents if they can lay their hands on them”).  
176 Furth, “Solitude, Silence and Concealment,” 29.
177 In a recent comparative study of individuals’ willingness to share personal information on 
different types of websites, participants from Taiwan, the USA, China and the Netherlands 
all showed a comparable tendency to regard genetic information as “very sensitive.”  Chi-
ung-wen (Julia) Hsu, Privacy Concerns, Privacy Practices and Web Site Categories: Towards 
a Situational Paradigm, Online Information Review, Vol. 30, No. 5, 2006, pp. 569-586, avail-
able at http://assets.emeraldinsight.com.   Adams, Murata and Orito assert that, “while tem-
porary physical conditions may be discussed [in Japan] with a broader circle than in other 
cultures, permanent physical disability and mental health problems are mostly taboo sub-
jects, and hence one of those pieces of information which is strongly held by the Japanese to  
be private.”  Adams, Murata and Orito, at 335..
178 Min Qiji, 1640 preface to Qi Zhongfu, Nüke baiwen (Shanghai: Shanghai guji shudian, 1983 
reprint, quoted in Furth, “Solitude, Silence and Concealment,” 36.  The Qing Dynasty (1644-
1911) attempted to outlaw the practice of footbinding, but found its edicts impossible to en-
force “since women who had bound feet were usually cloistered and women who did the 
binding did it in private…” McDougall, “Particulars and Universals,” 13.
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known as “as-if,” which “requires that information overheard but not expli-
citly given, is treated as if one did not have it.”179  In traditional Japanese 
housing, which consisted literally of paper-thin walls, the “as-if” tradition 
“allowed, for example, spouses to have arguments without the rest of the 
household treating them as though their marriage was in trouble,  unless 
one or both partners approached a third party for help or advice in the mat-
ter.”180
In traditional Chinese family life, individual emotional needs often yield 
to those of the family, but not always.  In a scene from the 18th-century clas-
sic novel  Dream of the Red Chamber, widely considered to be emblematic of 
the daily life of Chinese aristocracy at that time, a young woman named 
Xifeng is humiliated by her mother-in-law, and flees to her own apartment, 
weeping.  When she is called back, she wipes her tears, applies makeup, 
and then denies she has been crying, insisting that her eyes are simply itchy. 
Robin Silber finds in this instance four distinct mechanisms of control used 
to establish privacy:  “withdrawal  (leaving),  concealment (new make-up), 
deception (itching, rubbing) and denial.   For Xifeng to have been caught 
crying in the context of her humiliation would have only deepened it; this is 
why Xifeng wants privacy to cry.” 181
There is also sufficient evidence from the early to mid-twentieth century 
of both an appreciation for and expectation of privacy in diaries and corres-
pondence,  in both China and Japan.   In the correspondence between the 
prominent Chinese writer Lu Xun and his paramour Xu Guangping (who 
jointly published an edited version of their love letters in 1933), several pas-
sages evince an assumption that their correspondence will not be opened 
and read by third parties (and indeed, it was not until 1933 that the Chinese 
Post Office began engaging in censorship).182  Lu Xun at one point expresses 
agitation when he discovers that a cousin has been reading his old diaries.  
183  It is clear that the secrecy between the two had the function of “creating 
179 Andrew A. Adams, Kiyoshi Murata and Yohko Orito, “The Japanese Sense of Information 
Privacy,” AI & Soc. (2009) 24:327-341, at 329.  
180 Adams,  Murata  and Orito,  at  329.   The “as-if”  tradition  is  also  discussed in  Masahiko 
Mizutani, James Dorsey, and James H. Moore, “The internet and Japanese conception of pri-
vacy,” Ethics and Information Technology 6: 121-128, at 121 (2004).  Mizutani, Dorsey and 
Moore use this example to distinguish between “descriptive privacy; i.e., absence of privacy 
as a matter of fact, and…normative privacy” (normative protections from certain intrusions 
and information gathering).  Id. 
181 Silber, “Privacy in Dream of the Red Chamber,” 65-66.
182 Bonnie McDougall, “Functions and Values of Privacy in the Correspondence Between Lu 
Xun and Xu Guangping, 1925-1929,” 153. 
183 Bonnie McDougall, “Functions and Values of Privacy,” 155. 
2013] Lara A. Ballard: The Dao of Privacy 151
or confirming intimacy between them,” such that  they continued to pre-
serve  their  “secret  world”  even  after  they  became  a  publicly  accepted 
couple. 184  
The diaries of Japanese soldiers kept during World War II similarly re-
flect both a desire and an expectation of privacy.  Even though they were 
created during service to a totalitarian regime capable of inspiring kamikaze 
acts of self-sacrifice, Aaron William Moore finds no real difference between 
Japanese  soldiers’ wartime  diaries  and those  of  their  American  counter-
parts.185  The diaries sometimes display what Moore calls “self-mobiliza-
tion”; i.e., incorporation of popular patriotic discourse to direct oneself to-
wards “state and military mobilization goals” (e.g.,  “[We] have taken up 
[our] path as soldiers….This gives us joy.  We are sent off by shouts of ‘Ban-
zai’ by our enthusiastic countrymen”).186  But as the reality of war sets in, 
and units  begin  to  participate  in  the  massacres  of  Chinese  civilians  and 
POWs, the diaries take on a tone decidedly unsuitable for wartime propa-
ganda (“…some of them, who had only feigned death, started to run, so we 
stabbed them one by one.  It felt horrible, like the ‘living hell’”; “On the 
bank of an irrigation canal, there was a dead child, and a bit further down, 
two  adults’ bodies  with  no  heads  had  been  carried  to  the  bank  by  the 
stream.  It is so horrible, I can’t look”).187   The Japanese soldier typically 
“wrote his self-narrative in a manner that he found personally compelling, 
not appealing to military, state, and media  authorities, because they were 
not reading it.”188  And in fact, despite some efforts by the Japanese military 
to confiscate or destroy soldiers’ wartime diaries (an operational necessity in 
some circumstances, due to their value to foreign intelligence), soldiers had 
“sundry tricks for avoiding possible confiscation of one’s personal records: 
184 Bonnie McDougall, “Functions and Values of Privacy,” 155. 
185 Aaron William Moore, “The Chimera of Privacy: Reading Self-Discipline in Japanese Diaries 
from the Second World War,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 68, No.  (February 2009), 165-
198, at 175, 175 n.25, 185, 185 n.45.  The existence of these diaries is reminiscent of the classic  
wartime diary of dissident Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, which he maintained secretly under wartime 
surveillance between 1942 and 1945, and which caused a sensation in Japan when it was 
published posthumously in 1948.  See generally Eugene Soviak, ed., A Diary of Darkness:  
The Wartime Diary of Kiyosawa Kiyoshi (1999).
186 Moore, 185 (citing passages from the diary of Nagatani Masao, written in August 1937). 
Moore finds comparable passages in the diary of American Captain Ralph T. Noonan and in 
war reportage such as Richard Tregasaski’s Guadalcanal Diary, describing the events of 1943 
(“It’s the first time in history we’ve ever had a huge expedition of this kind accompanied by 
transports.   It’s  of  world-wide importance.   You’d be surprised if  you knew how many 
people all over the world are following this.  You cannot fail them”).  Moore, 185-86 n.45.  
187 Moore, 190 (citing the diaries of and Nagatani Masao and Yamamoto Kenji, respectively)
188 Moore, 189.  
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tying the diary to the inside of one’s thigh, sending it through civilian mail 
during temporary furlough, or entrusting the diary to a friend who was be-
ing  sent  home  through  a  military  hospital  (where  no  inspections 
occurred).”189  Pilot Nishimoto Masaharu flatly disobeyed an order at the 
end of the war to burn his diaries, writing in the forward to one notebook 
that he later published that it was his personal record, “which I held close to 
my heart without thinking—it brought tears to my eyes.”190
East Asians have no apparent difficulty discerning the link between gov-
ernment surveillance and oppression, or appreciating the dehumanizing ef-
fects  of  data  collection.   The  movement  of  ethnic  Koreans in  Japan (the 
Zainichi) towards greater acceptance and an end to legal discrimination was 
galvanized  in  September  1980  by  a  single  Tokyo  resident  named  Han 
Chongsok, who refused to submit to fingerprinting under penalty of impris-
onment.  Regular fingerprinting of “foreigners” was a legal requirement un-
der the Alien Registration Law that was eventually abolished following a 
widespread  anti-fingerprinting  civil  disobedience  campaign  inspired  by 
Han Chongsok.191 
Finally, one can find among East Asians an acute sensitivity to new tech-
nologies  and  forms  of  modernization  that  shift  the  boundaries  between 
public and private, often with extreme psychological consequences for the 
individual.  Yunxiang Yan analyzes the effects of Chinese socialism on the 
small village of Xiajia between 1949 and 1999, and concludes that the Com-
munists’ destruction of the old patriarchal order (in an attempt to replace fa-
milial authority with state authority) “has opened up new horizons for the 
individual-centered  development  of  romantic  love,  intimacy,  conjugality, 
and the pursuit  of  personal space and privacy.”192  This  particularly has 
been the case in the post-Mao era, in which capitalism has largely replaced 
communism as the dominant organizing principle.  After the “decollectiviz-
ation” reforms of 1983, village-wide cultural activities largely came to an 
end, and leisure activities in Xiajia shifted to the private home, chief among 
189 Moore, 169.  
190 Nishimoto Masaharu, Yokaren nikki (2003, 6), quoted in Moore, at 171-72. 
191 John Lie, “Zainichi Recognitions: Japan’s Korean Residents’ Ideology and Its Discontents, 
Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Nov. 10, 2008, available online at http://www.britannica.-
com/bps/additionalcontent/18/35374468/Zainichi-Recognitions-Japan See  also  generally 
http://www.mindan.org.  
192 Yunxiang  Yan,  Private  Life  Under  Socialism:  Love,  Intimacy,  and  Family  Change  in  a 
Chinese Village 1949-1999, 218 (2003).
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them, television viewing.193  These changes have had an enormous effect on 
the civic-mindedness of the community.  
The new individualism of modern Chinese society, with its “shifting urb-
an configurations,” reshape Chinese conceptions of privacy in ways that are 
often  deeply  unsettling,  as  reflected  in  modern  dystopic  urban  fiction. 
Protagonists in such works often express a “sense of repulsion and aliena-
tion” from the city’s anonymous masses.194  In the 1988 novel Hei de xue 
(Black Snow), for example, the main character has only a few friends who 
“show little concern for his well-being; they instead demonstrate the classic 
utilitarian traits of social relations in a market economy.”195  Paradoxically, 
such protagonists find the changes that come with urban modernity, includ-
ing spatial changes such as the broadening of the streets of Beijing and the 
destruction of its old quarters with “secluded back alley communities,” in-
vasive of their privacy, and become desperate for a form of seclusion that 
will help restore their sense of self. 196  In Chen Ran’s controversial 1996 nov-
el, Siren shenghuo (Private Life), the protagonist (who eventually suffers a 
breakdown) “cloisters herself within her house,” becoming particularly ob-
sessed  with the bathroom,197 but “the exterior space of the city constantly 
threatens to intrude on her privacy: ‘the solemn and heavy breath of Beijing 
spreads through the room and fills her lungs, like grey, dirty time.’”198  In 
each of these novels, “privacy is valued as a means of recuperating losses in-
herent in the urban transformations of contemporary China: loss of mean-
ing,  intimacy,  self-respect,  individuality,  boundaries,  space  and  ethical 
norms.” 199  At the same time, “[t]he privileging of interiority over exterior-
ity and of withdrawal into the self over social engagement speaks more to a 
disenfranchisement and loss of agency than the seeming rational autonomy 
afforded by privacy.” 200
193 Yunxiang Yan, 36.  
194 Robin Visser, “Privacy and its Ill  Effects in Post-Mao Urban Fiction,” in McDougall and 
Hansson, eds., Chinese Concepts of Privacy 171 (2002).  
195 Robin Visser, “Privacy and its Ill Effects in Post-Mao Urban Fiction,” 174.
196 Robin Visser, “Privacy and its Ill Effects in Post-Mao Urban Fiction,” 186.
197 Id.  Redecorating bathrooms actually became a Chinese obsession in cities in the mid-1990s; 
Shanghai residents spent an average of $1250 modernizing their bathrooms in 1996.  Robin 
Visser, “Privacy and its Ill Effects in Post-Mao Urban Fiction,” 185.
198 Robin Visser, “Privacy and its Ill  Effects in Post-Mao Urban Fiction,” 180 (quoting Chen 
Ran, Siren shenghuo 37 (1996).  
199 Robin Visser, “Privacy and its Ill Effects in Post-Mao Urban Fiction,” 193.
200 Robin Visser, “Privacy and its Ill Effects in Post-Mao Urban Fiction,” 183.
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One would therefore fully expect that East Asians would be just as at-
tuned as Westerners to the shifting of social boundaries brought about by 
automated data processing and Internet-based communications.  This ex-
pectation is more or less borne out by contemporary research.  Sometimes 
the change is a welcome one.  On the wildly popular social network Cy-
world (on which nearly 90% of 24-to-29-year old South Koreans have ac-
counts), users report that they are often able to resolve interpersonal con-
flicts on each other’s home pages by expressing thoughts and feelings in a 
way they cannot do face to face.201  Particular aspects of Korean collectivistic 
culture and its “high-context” communicative style can render it difficult to 
express thoughts and feelings in detailed or explicit  ways,  but the asyn-
chronous nature of communication on social networks has the advantage of 
allowing reviewability.  As one user puts it, “When the word is out, it be-
longs to another.  It is not always easy to articulate my thoughts in spoken 
words, and I often make mistakes in speaking.  In writing, I can review and 
revise my words as many times as I want before they get to another person. 
That is the best part of cying.”202  The same phenomenon is seen in Japan, 
where web diaries allow individuals to “write about things that they can’t 
talk about in their real communities.”203
But East Asians have also experienced the negative side of the Internet’s 
tendency to shrink geographic and other boundaries, and their concerns are 
publicly  articulated and discussed,  sometimes  leading to  new legislative 
proposals.   A phenomenon unique to China is  that of the renrou sousou 
(“human flesh  search  engines”),  a  combination  of  Internet-based  crowd-
sourcing and real-world vigilantism. In 2007, the wife of a Saatchi & Saatchi 
advertising executive named Wang Fei, despondent over her husband’s ex-
tramarital affair, kept a meticulous online diary documenting her deepening 
despair and then leaped to her death from their 24th-floor  apartment. The 
woman’s  sister  then  found  the  diary,  which  the  deceased  woman  had 
wanted to make public after her death, and published it on the web, later 
201 Kyung-Hee Kim and Haejin Yun, Cying for Me, Cying for Us: Relational Dialectics in a 
Korean Social Network Site, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13(1), Art. 15,  
available online at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/kim.yun.html.  
202 Cying for Me, Cying for Us.  
203 Makoto Nakada and Takanori Tamura, Japanese Conceptions of Privacy: An Intercultural 
Perspective, Ethics and Information Technology (2005) 7:27-36, at 33-34.
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participating in discussions about her sister’s death at an online community 
forum.204  
Almost instantly, an online mob--the human flesh search engine--
enraged at Wang's philandering, exploded into life.  Within days, 
photographs  of  Wang  appeared  on  numerous  Internet  forums 
alongside  his  phone  numbers,  address  and  national  ID  number. 
Slogans were painted on his front door. One read: "A blood debt 
must be repaid with blood."205
Wang was eventually forced to resign after his employer’s Beijing office 
became  the  target  of  harassment.   He  subsequently  sued  two  Internet 
portals that had hosted the hunt for his identity.206  In August 2008, a new 
law was proposed in China that would impose a three-year jail sentence on 
government officials who leak data that could be “snapped up by the hu-
man flesh search engine.”207  
To the extent the Japanese have been slow to react to the privacy 
challenges posed by the automated processing of personal data, this may be 
in large part attributable to the use of kanji characters, which did not lend it-
self well to data processing in interoperable systems until the 1990s.208   The 
Japanese style of “insular collectivism,” or “groupism,” which produces so-
cial norms requiring one to control both information flow and manner of 
speaking in a way that differentiates one’s inner circle of family and close 
friends (uchi) and outer circle of acquaintances (soto), traditionally left the 
Japanese with little concern for whether their private information was re-
vealed to total strangers (tanin).  This was because a total stranger was seen 
as having no continuing contact with the individual, thus “depriving such 
relevations of their  danger.”209  Moreover,  the “as-if”  tradition remained 
strong, and “[t]he expectation that organizations would honour the as-if tra-
dition of discounting known information (such as that necessarily collected 
204 Tom Downey, “China’s Cyberposse,” New York Times Magazine, March 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/magazine/07Human-t.html?pagewanted=1. 
205 Chris O’Brien, “The Human Flesh Search Engine,” Forbes.com, Nov. 21, 2008, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/11/21/human-flesh-search-tech-identity08-cx_cb_1121obri-
en.html.  
206 Downey.  He was awarded “very minor damages” from one of the ISPs.  Id. 
207 Chris O’Brien, “The Human Flesh Search Engine.”  
208 Andrew A. Adams, Kiyoshi Murata and Yohko Orito, The Japanese Sense of Privacy, AI & 
Soc (2009) 24:327-341, at 335.  
209 Adams, Murata and Orito, at 331. 
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in dealing with customers)” lasted well into the 1990s.210  However, once it 
became evident that automated data processing could easily transmit per-
sonal  data between soto entities (such as local government, telecom pro-
viders, and other entities formerly regarded as tanin before they became in-
terconnected with the individual), there was a “rapid awakening amongst 
the Japanese that social norms are no longer sufficient to regulate the pro-
tection of information privacy.”211
A comparative study of Internet privacy practices revealed no real differ-
ence in the overall concern for privacy among users in the U.S., the Nether-
lands, China and Taiwan; if anything, the East Asians demonstrated more 
concern about improper data sharing and usage.  There were pronounced 
differences between the subjects, but they were quite context-specific and 
attributable to any of a variety of cultural factors.  For example, the Americ-
ans were more comfortable sharing personal data with commercial websites 
than with government websites, whereas the Chinese subjects were more 
likely to disclose data to either government websites or community web-
sites, and were less comfortable than either the Americans or the Taiwanese 
with disclosing data to commercial websites.212
In short,  there is  no discernible  link between a culture’s  tendency to-
wards  individualism  and  the  value  it  places  on  privacy.   “Individual 
autonomy” appears to be  simply the language through which Westerners 
articulate privacy concerns that are actually more universal in nature.  Col-
lectivist thinking may affect certain privacy practices or mechanisms in par-
ticular contexts, but if one were to envision a spectrum running from ex-
treme individualism to extreme collectivism,  there simply  is  no basis  on 
which to place “concern for privacy” anywhere along that spectrum.  Again, 
what this indicates is that the Altman/Inness conceptualization of privacy, 
both  of  which  share  with  postmodernism  the  interdependent  and  so-
cially-situated notion of the self, has the potential not only to deepen and 
add nuance to the Western understanding of privacy, but to form the basis 
of a privacy standard with a more cross-cultural appeal and the potential 
for  global  acceptance.   Nonetheless,  there  are  many  questions  left  un-
answered, some of which are the subject of the next section.
210 Adams, Murata and Orito, at 339.
211 Adams, Murata and Orito, at 335. 
212 Chiung-wen (Julia) Hsu, Privacy Concerns, Privacy Practices and Web Site Categories, On-
line Information Review, Vol. 30, No. 5 (2006), pp. 569-586.  
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5. DAOISM, INDIVIDUALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW
If East Asians have as deep an appreciation for privacy as Westerners, then 
what explains the widespread perception among Easterners and Westerners 
alike that privacy rights are a Western construct?  Why would Japan have 
problems with the “overprotection” of personal data, as suggested in the In-
troduction?  And what explains the relatively “weak” privacy framework 
developed by APEC?  The answers lie in the connection between individual-
istic thinking and a tendency towards legalistic solutions, and they have ser-
ious ramifications for the development of a global legal regime to protect  
privacy  as  an  individual  human right.   Just  as  the  Daoist  metaphysical 
foundation leads to certain views of the nature of selfhood, it also provides 
the basis for conclusions about the ideal manner in which to resolve inter-
personal disputes.  To understand this connection, we must return to an-
cient Daoism and its interactions with another school of Chinese thought, a 
school known today as “Legalism.”
Legalism has some ties to Daoism, but Daoism and Legalism ulti-
mately  came  to  represent  “the  two  extremes  of  Chinese  thought.   The 
Taoists maintained that man originally is innocent; the Legalists, on the oth-
er hand, that he is completely evil.  The Taoists stood for absolute individual 
freedom; the Legalists for absolute social control.”213  
Legalism,  like  the  other  major  schools  of  Chinese  philosophy,  came 
about in the wake of the disintegration of feudalism, and was embraced 
wholeheartedly by the Ch’in Dynasty as a means of consolidating power in 
a complex governmental structure seeking to assert absolute control over a 
vast geographic area.214  At that time, “[w]hat the rulers needed were not 
idealistic programs for doing good to their people, but realistic methods for 
dealing with the new situations faced by their government.”215  
The main proponents of Legalism, Shang Yang (“Lord Shang”) and 
Han Fei Tze, saw strict and uniform enforcement of the law not a means of 
obtaining justice and equality, but as a highly effective method of consolid-
ating power in  the supreme sovereign.   Lord Shan advised that  punish-
ments should know no degree or grade, but…from ministers of state and 
generals down to great officers and ordinary folk, whosoever does not obey 
the king’s commands, violates the interdicts of the state, or rebels against 
213 Fung Yu-Lan, 162-63. 
214 Fung Yu-Lan, 156-57. 
215 Fung Yu-Lan, 156.
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the statutes fixed by the ruler, should be guilty of death and should not be 
pardoned.  Merit acquired in the past should not cause a decrease in the 
punishment for demerit later, nor should good behaviour in the past cause 
any derogation of the law for wrong done later.216
Han Fei Tze advised against “arbitrary regulation,” arguing that “the in-
telligent sovereign makes the law select men and makes no arbitrary pro-
motion himself.”217 The Legalists believed strongly that “[t]he rule of man 
depends upon his judgment but his judgment can never be as well-defined 
and as reliable as law.” 218  Moreover, uniformity of application was essen-
tial to the rule of law; Han Fei Tze related the following story as an example 
of good bureaucratic decision making:
Once in bygone days, Marquis Chao of Han was drunk and fell into a 
nap.  The crown-keeper, seeing the ruler exposed to cold, put a coat over 
him.   When the Marquis  awoke,  he  was glad and asked the  attendants, 
“Who  put  more  clothes  on  my  body?”   “The  crown-keeper  did,”  they 
replied.  Then the Marquis found the coat-keeper guilty and put the crown-
keeper to death.  He punished the coat-keeper for the neglect of his duty, 
and the crown-keeper for the overriding of his post.219
The Legalists advised that “in order to rule a country, it is better to de-
pend upon laws than upon men, because men will come and go, but law is 
the measure which remains for ever.”220  Unfortunately for them, the Ch’in 
Dynasty, in following their advice, collapsed in 206 B.C. after having unified 
China only fifteen years prior.  In the wake of the collapse, “commentators 
placed all the blame on Ch’in’s reliance on the laws,” and Daoism (Huang-
Lao) and later Confucianism became the official state ideology.221
This  brief  experiment  with  the  rule  of  law (perhaps  more  accurately 
termed “rule by law”) appears to have left a rather bad taste for it through-
out  the  Confucian  world.  Man-made  law,  or  fa,  became associated with 
harshness and cruelty, something “soulless” that “aims only at regimenta-
216 The Book of Lord Shang (Shang Chün Shu), reproduced in Masters of Chinese Political  
Thought, Sebastian de Grazia, ed. 342 (1973).
217 The Han Fei Tzü, reproduced in Masters of Chinese Political Thought, Sebastian de Grazia, 
ed. 354 (1973).
218 Chou Hsiang-Kuang, Political Thought of China 59 (1954). 
219 The Han Fei Tzü, reproduced in Masters of Chinese Political Thought, Sebastian de Grazia, 
ed. 354 (1973).
220 Chou Hsiang-Kuang, Political Thought of China 59 (1954). 
221 Kung-chuan Hsiao, A History of Chinese Political Thought, 548.  
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tion.”222  Law certainly existed and was sometimes considered a small sub-
component  of  ethics,223 but  it  was  not  used  either  to  limit  the  ultimate 
power of the sovereign or, by and large, as a means of civil dispute resolu-
tion.  “To Confucian thinkers, law was for barbarians, not for Confucians…. 
’[L]aw’ was considered punitive and identical to criminal law; a ‘lawsuit’ 
was concerned with crime and, thus, was disgraceful, and ‘litigation’ was 
perceived as a humiliating process.  People simply knew that when they vi-
olated the law, they would be punished.  They did not think law could pro-
tect their civil interests.”224 
This  is  not  to say that  the central  government provided no means of 
bringing grievances against the government.  To the contrary, in China there 
were  well-established  and  often  elaborate  procedures  for  lodging  griev-
ances,  appeals  therefrom and general  criticisms or  remonstrations of  the 
ruler, dating from the Zhou Dynasty, when even the most humble common-
ers were allowed to beat a drum outside the innermost palace gate to have 
their case reported directly to the king.225  Under the theory of the Mandate 
of Heaven, “Chinese governments claimed authority based on the natural 
mandate that was revealed, in part, by the attitudes of the people,” and if 
such grievances were ignored or the complainants punished, it was feared 
that “[t]he ruler would thus be deprived of information that might enable 
him to hold on to the mandate to rule.”226  But such grievance procedures 
did not provide a means of invalidating decisions made by the supreme 
ruler, and in fact,  the  Empress Wu Zetian (r. 690-705) used the grievance 
222 Chou Hsiang-Kuang, Political Thought of China 65 (1954). 
223 Richard H. Minear, Japanese Tradition and Western Law:  Emperor, State and Law in the 
Thought of Hozumi Yatsuka 155 (1970).  The legal codes developed in China during the 
T’ang Dynasty were studied by visiting Japanese envoys and later formed the basis for the 
Japanese legal codes known as ritsuryo in the seventh century A.D.  The ritsuryo remained 
on the books until the mid-19th century, but had become increasingly irrelevant after nobles 
came to rule the country in the 10th century.  Hiroshi Oda, Japanese Law 13-14 (2d Ed. 1999). 
224 Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East Asia:  From the Legal Culture Per-
spective, 1 Asian-Pacific L. & Pol’y J. 13, (2000). In Korea, throughout the 600-year rule of 
the Yi Dynasty, “the vast majority of the people viewed the law as a means of oppression, 
while the upper class saw the law as a convenient tool to perpetuate their status and priv-
ileges.”  Chan Jim Kim, Korean Attitudes Towards Law, 10 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y 1, 6-7 (2000). 
This view of the law among average Koreans was only exacerbated when Japan imposed 
Western-style law (primarily German in inspiration) on Korea during its 35-year occupation 
(1910-1945).  Once again, law was simply “an instrument of exploitation and was used to 
justify a systematic destruction of traditional Korean society….[L]aw itself came to symbol-
ize the colonial rule.”  Id. at 7.
225 Qiang Fang, “Hot Potatoes: Chinese Complaint Systems from Early Times to the Late Qing 
(1898),” Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 68, No. 4 (November) 2009: 1105-1135, at 1107.
226 Qiang Fang, 1107.  
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process primarily to receive secret reports about her enemies.227  Allowing 
commoners to lodge grievances against lower-level officials was an effective 
means of ensuring their loyalty and commitment to the prerogatives of the 
sovereign, but it did not constitute a check on the power of the ultimate sov-
ereign in the Western sense of independent judicial review.  The reluctance 
of any court or judicial body to question the ultimate head of government is 
evident  even in very recent decisions of the Taiwanese council  of Grand 
Justices of the Judicial Yuan and the Korean Constitutional Court, widely 
considered success stories for the notion of the rule of law in East Asia.228 
While such courts have been “quite eager to challenge lower authorities that 
have violated principles of legality and constitutionality,” “[w]hen confron-
ted with questions involving the personal authority of the president, they 
play a role similar  to  magistrates  remonstrating the emperor,  sometimes 
suggesting or advising but not demanding action.”229
Civil disputes in the traditional cultures of Northeast Asia were gener-
ally seen as private affairs, to be informally resolved by a mediator known 
to the parties, such as a family friend.230  During the Tokugawa Shogunate 
in Japan (1600-1867), for example, there was a civil procedure administered 
by  the  government  known as  ginmi-suji,  available  for  disputes  between 
private individuals, but
[s]uch disputes were expected to be settled without the involvement of 
the authority if possible, and it was thought to be a favour on the part of the 
227 Qiang Fang, 1112.  
228 See generally Tom Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism?  The Emergence of Constitu-
tional Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27 Law & Soc. Inquiry 763 (2002).  The Council  of  
Grand Justices was established and granted the power of judicial review in the late 1940s as 
part  of  the establishment of the Republic  of  Korea.   Id.  at  768.   Chiang Kai-shek ruled  
Taiwan with “an iron hand,” primarily relying on martial law, but his son and successor,  
Chiang Ching-kuo, began to dramatically liberalize Taiwan starting in the mid-1980s, and 
starting in 1990, the Council became instrumental in “dismantling the tools of authoritarian-
ism” and serving as a “vehicle for the importation of foreign norms into the constitutional 
system,” particularly in the area of criminal procedure and the military.  Id. at 769-773.  The 
Korean Constitutional Court was established by constitutional amendment in 1987 follow-
ing several decades of military rule, and has issued several important decisions regarding  
citizens’ constitutional rights.  For example, in 1989, the court found an implied “right to 
know” in the constitution, finding it “indisputable that public information must be released 
to those with a direct interest in it…”  Id. at 781 (quoting Judgment of September 4, 1989, 88 
HonMa 22).    This finding is  “quite radical  in the context of the developmental  state of 
Northeast Asia.  For the first time, citizens can make affirmative demands for information 
from the Korean state and need not rely on the ‘benevolent paternalism’ of the past.”  Id. at  
781. 
229 Ginsburg, 792.  
230 Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East Asia: From the Legal Culture Per-
spective, 1 Asian-Pacific L. & Pol’y J. 13 (2000).  
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authority to  trouble  themselves  with such trivial  matters.   Therefore,  in-
formal settlement of disputes (nasai) by conciliation arranged by local offi-
cials or elders was encouraged.  In fact, the Shogunate, as a rule, dispensed 
without hearing and sometimes even forced the parties  to  reach a com-
promise under pain of punishment.231
Moreover, civil dispute resolution aimed not so much at establishing the 
objective rightness  or  wrongness  of one party  or  the other’s  position,  as 
simply providing a process in which mutual concession was expected.232 
This is in perfect keeping with underlying Daoist metaphysical beliefs about 
the nature and discoverability of truth, as reflected in this passage from the 
Zhuangzi:
Suppose you and I have had an argument.  If you have beaten me in-
stead of my beating you, then are you necessarily right and am I necessarily 
wrong?  If I have beaten you instead of your beating me, then am I necessar-
ily right and you are necessarily wrong?  Is one of us right and the other 
wrong?  Are both of us right or are both of  us wrong?  If you and I don’t 
know the answer, then other people are bound to be even more in the dark. 
Whom shall we get to decide what is right?  Shall we get someone who 
agrees with you to decide?  But if he already agrees with you, how can he 
decide fairly?  Shall we get someone who agrees with me?  But if he already 
agrees with me, how can he decide?....[W]aiting for one shifting voice to 
pass judgment on another is the same as waiting for none of them….Right is 
not right; so is not so.  If right were really right, it would differ so clearly 
from not right that there would be no need for argument.233 
Japan, Korea, China and Taiwan have each taken radically different 
historical, geopolitical and ideological paths towards their present legal re-
gimes and political orders; “[i]t is indeed meaningless to put Japanese and 
Chinese  law  in  the  same category  on  any  basis  except  geographical.”234 
Thus,  the  remarkable  similarities  in  how individuals  from each  of  these 
231 Hiroshi Oda, Japanese Law 20 (2nd Ed. 1999). 
232 Shin-yi Peng
233 Zhuangzi, reproduced in Masters of Chinese Political Thought, 287-88. 
234 Hiroshi Oda, Japanese Law 5 (2d Ed. 1999).  
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countries’ respective cultures interact with the law235 render it difficult to 
draw any conclusion other than that these similarities correlate to Daoist  
metaphysical presumptions and notions of the socially-situated self.  Inter-
national business experts Charles Hampten-Turner and Alfons Trompenaars 
have conducted dozens of surveys of middle managers taking their sem-
inars across the world, asking questions  that reveal what a marked differ-
ence  exists  among cultures  in  their  preference  for  universally  applicable 
rules vs. special consideration of cases based on their distinctive aspects. 
One of their questions deals with how to handle the case of an employee 
whose work for a company, though excellent for fifteen years, has been un-
satisfactory for a year.  If there is no reason to expect that performance will 
improve, should the employee be (a) dismissed on the grounds that job per-
formance should remain the grounds for dismissal, regardless of the age of 
the person and his previous record; or (b) is it wrong to disregard the fifteen 
years the employee has been working for the company?...
More than 75 percent of Americans and Canadians felt that the employee 
should be let go.  About 20 percent of Koreans and Singaporeans agreed 
with that view.  About 30 percent of Japanese, French, Italians, and Germans 
agreed and about  40 percent  of  British,  Australians,  Dutch and Belgians 
agreed. (Atypically for this question, the British and the Australians were 
closer to the continental Europeans than to the North Americans).236
Virtually any Westerner who enters into legal contracts with East Asian 
entities on a regular basis can attest to the pronounced differences in busi-
ness cultures.  “To the Western mind, once a bargain is struck, it shouldn’t 
be modified; a deal is a deal.  For Easterners, agreements are often regarded 
as tentatively agreed-upon guides for the future.”237  In China,  it  is  well 
known that the economy is based on relationships, and “business transac-
tions are made on the strength, not of contracts, but of personal agreements 
which are neither verifiable nor enforceable in the public sphere.”238  One 
might anticipate more respect for the sanctity of a legal contract in cosmo-
235 Shin-yi Peng harbors no doubt that there is a “single Asian approach to law” that applies to 
most countries that were strongly influenced by Confucianism.  Shin-yi Peng,  
236 Nisbett, at 65 (citing to Charles Hampten-Turner and Alfons Trompenaars, The Seven Cul-
tures of Capitalism: Value Systems for Creating Wealth in the United States, Japan, Ger-
many, France, Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands (1993)).  
237 Nisbett, at 196.  
238 Hudson N. Janisch, “Administrative process and the rule of law,” in China and the Long 
March to Global Trade: The Accession of China to the World Trade Organization, Sylvia 
Ostry, Alan S. Alexandroff, and Rafael Gomez, eds. 192 (2002).  
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politan, Westernized and capitalistic Japan than in Communist China, but 
this is not necessarily the case.  In a well-known case from the 1970s, for ex-
ample, Japanese sugar refiners had entered into a contract with Australian 
suppliers to provide them with sugar at a certain price.  After the value of 
sugar on the world market dropped dramatically, the Japanese company 
sought a renegotiation of the contract “on the grounds that circumstances 
had changed radically,” which the Australians refused to entertain.239  Nis-
bett insists that 
[t]he Japanese were not being hypocritical or purely self serving.  Japan-
ese suppliers take such matters under consideration with their own custom-
ers.  If it snows in Tokyo, film distributors are likely to compensate theater  
owners  for  their  diminished  audiences.   As…Hampten-Turner  and 
Trompenaars note, “Looked at analytically on an item-by-item basis, [such 
accommodating behavior] is not cost effective.  But looked at as strengthen-
ing the relationship between customer and supplier,  it  makes very good 
sense.”  In short, the Japanese take a holistic view of the business relation-
ship, including its context over time.240
Such a view of interpersonal relationships leaves little room for the no-
tion of individual legal “rights,” and the relative novelty of both legal rights 
and human rights is another constant throughout China, Korea and Japan. 
In Japan, early in the Meiji Restoration (1867-1912), a scholar who had been 
commissioned to translate the French Civil Code “racked his brain to find a 
Japanese equivalent of ‘droit’ and finally came up with a Japanese coinage 
‘kenri.’”241  The Chinese equivalent, quanli, first appeared during the same 
time frame in a Chinese translation of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of Inter-
national Law.242  The exposure to Western thought in the late 19th and early 
20th century, which often came to China circuitously via Japan, set off a furi-
ous debate about human rights and a mad scramble for additional neolo-
gisms, including the Chinese term tianfu renquan (“heaven-endowed hu-
man rights”);  the  Japanese  term tenzen no kengi  (tianran  zhi  quanyi  in 
Chinese), introduced in an 1876 Japanese translation of the French Declara-
239 Nisbett, at 66.
240 Nisbett, at 197. 
241 Hideo Tanaka, ed., The Japanese Legal System 305 (1976).   
242 Angle, at 3. 
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tion of the Rights of Man as corresponding to “natural rights”; 243 and the 
Chinese term renge (meaning both “personality” and “dignity of the human 
person”).244 
Even  where  Western  concepts  of  human  rights  and  “freedom”  were 
wholeheartedly embraced (as with prominent reformer Liang Qichao, who 
enthusiastically quoted Patrick Henry’s “give me liberty or give me death”), 
245 they were more often than not imbued with a collective understanding 
when applied to the East Asian context.  The Western political theorists who 
held the greatest appeal were those, like John Dewey, who stressed com-
munity values (as well as, of course, that other great Western thinker, Karl 
Marx).246
The Chinese who were writing on human rights invoked them against a 
despotic ruler, the Manchus, in much the same way as the Americans earlier 
had used the idea against the English, and the French against l’ancien re-
gime.  But…the Chinese context was different from that of the West in that 
the main worry for most Chinese people was the encroachment of the West-
ern powers and the possible extinction of their race and nation.  National 
survival rather than freedom of the individual from an oppressive state was 
the main preoccupation.247
This understanding of “freedom” is reflected in the 1982 Constitution of 
the People’s Republic of China, which mentions freedom twelve times, but 
is understood to refer to “’organic sovereignal freedom,’ the freedom of the 
entire community from external oppression ….”248  It does not necessarily 
correspond to an individual’s legal entitlement  to certain civil liberties or 
political freedoms vis-à-vis the state. 
243 Svensson, 79. 
244 Svensson, 104-05. 
245 Svensson, 101. 
246 Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism (1995), p. 206, quoted in 
Svensson, at 132.  Both Dewey and Bertrand Russell lectured in China between 1919 and 
1921, but Dewey’s holistic liberalism held greater appeal than Russell’s fierce individualism. 
Id. Dewey regarded the right to property as “a rather empty right for those who did not  
own any property,” and he “supported the idea that the government should provide old-
age  pensions  and  unemployment  relief;  throughout  his  life  he  was  active  in  efforts  to 
provide education for socially disadvantaged people.”  Svensson, at 133.  At the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919, the Allies supported the transfer of the German concessions in Shan-
dong to Japan.  This prompted the May Fourth protests in China, radicalized many Chinese 
intellectuals and soured them on Western liberalism, to some degree prompting a gravita-
tion towards Communism and the political system of Russia as a viable alternative.  Id. at  
129-30. 
247 Svensson, 98. 
248 David Kelly, “The Chinese Search for Freedom as a Universal Value,” in Asian Freedoms: 
The Idea of Freedom in East and Southeast Asia 94 (1998).  
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Thus, when East Asians insist that East Asian cultures have no “tradition 
of privacy,” what this should be taken to mean is, as Professor Zhou Han-
hua states, “there had not been any legal tradition in China to emphasize 
the privacy right to confront with state power”249—because, in fact, there 
was not a tradition of emphasizing any legal right to confront state power.  
Nor was there, or is there, a tendency to invoke legal rights as the primary 
means  of  asserting  one’s  interests  vis-à-vis  governmental,  commercial  or 
other private entities, even where they clearly exist.  In Korea, for example,  
the Korean Criminal Procedure Code provides for full Miranda-type rights, 
but “police officers tend to omit or abbreviate the reading of such rights,” 
and  “criminal  suspects  often  do  not  object  to  the  violation  of  those 
rights.”250  In the Confucian mindset, it is “not virtuous for one to assert 
one’s rights.”251
Tracing  the  philosophical  lineage  of  Western  Enlightenment  thinking 
from Kant to Rawls, as Julie Cohen suggests, reveals just how essential the 
notion of the autonomous, disembodied self and the tendency towards ab-
stract objectification has been to modern Western legal thought  (including 
scholarship and jurisprudence on human and civil rights).  It also becomes 
apparent  how incompatible  this  tradition can be  with Daoism and Con-
fucianism, at both a sociopolitical and metaphysical level.  Kant followed up 
A Critique of Pure Reason with The Groundwork of the Metaphysics  of 
Morals (1785), in which he introduced the notion of the “categorical imper-
ative,” the notion that that a person acts morally only if his or her conduct 
would be the "right" conduct for any person in similar circumstances; i.e.,  
could form the basis of a universal law. “What is required is a notion of ra-
tionally informed action that is unconditional (not relating to concrete cir-
cumstances), objective, not relating to particular desires), and universal (ap-
plicable to all rational agents).”252  Otherwise, there is no real basis on which 
Kant can locate a free will sufficient to ascribe moral responsibility.  Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right (1820) locates the real-world embodiment of the free 
249 Zhou Hanhua,  Personal  Information  Protection  Enforcement  in  China:  Status  Quo  and 
Trend toward its Reform (paper on file with author; I am thankful to Marty Abrams for 
sharing this paper with me) (emphasis added). Professor Zhou is a professor of law at the 
Institute of Law at CASS.  [Look up Svensson for explanation of what CASS is—is it affili-
ated with the PRC?]  
250 Chan Jin Kim, Korean Attitudes Towards Law, 10 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y 1, 11 (2000).
251 Shin-yi Peng. Accord Hideo Tanaka, ed., The Japanese Legal System 302 (1976)(“Ordinary 
Japanese…feel ashamed of being subpoenaed by, or of taking somebody to, a court.”).  
252 Peter  Halewood,  Law’s  Bodies:  Disembodiment  and  the  Structure  of  Liberal  Property 
Rights, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1331, 1353-54 (1996).
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will in property and contract law, insofar as they articulate the relationship 
between two free wills.253  John Rawls draws further upon Kant’s categorical 
imperative in promoting the notion of justice as a “fairness” that is arrived 
at “when persons, as pure wills without bodies or context, choose the rules 
to govern justice in society from behind the ‘veil of ignorance.’”254  These 
theories are all quite wedded to Cartesian mind/body dualism.  
The problem with tossing out the entire Kantian line of thought is that it  
can then be difficult to assign either moral or legal responsibility to particu-
lar persons.  Individual autonomous “personhood” may be a fiction, but as 
a legal fiction, it is quite useful to the functioning of Western law.  Without 
the notion of a freely exercised will,  the concept of responsibility can be 
rather hard to pin down. 
A case in point is the Japanese attitude towards its involvement in World 
War II.  As the Japanese viewed it, the Pacific War just happened to break 
out.  None of the former government leaders who were tried at the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal for the Far East as first-class war criminals identi-
fied himself as someone responsible for having started the war.  This is in 
sharp contrast with the Nazi leaders who positively identified themselves as 
the ones who had deliberately started the war in Europe….In Japan, even 
her declaration of war against the Allied Powers is regarded as an incident 
that  happened  “in  some  way  or  another”  without  any  premeditated 
design.255
Rawls’ theories have been found particularly difficult to apply to East 
Asian societies  by human rights scholars,  for  the precise reason that  his 
concept of political and moral legitimacy “rules out any number of regimes 
in which order and legitimacy are established through means other than a 
modern legal system.”256  While Westerners “prefer to live by abstract prin-
ciples and like to believe these principles are applicable to everyone…to in-
sist on the same rules for every case can seem at best obtuse and rigid to the 
Easterner and at worst cruel.”257  While most East Asian countries have es-
tablished or are well on their way to establishing Western-style legal institu-
tions, due in no small part to 50 years of Western insistence that the rule of 
law is their ticket to modernity, economic development, and integration into 
253 Halewood, 1362.  
254 Halewood, 1340 (quoting John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 11-15 (1971)).  
255 Hideo Tanaka, ed., The Japanese Legal System 300 (1976).  
256 Angle, Stephen C., Human Rights and Chinese Thought 14 (2002).  
257 Nisbett, 64-65. 
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the  global  community,258 the  Chinese  tradition  of  governance  by  schol-
ar-gentlemen has given China “a tremendous handicap in  her  transition 
from government by men to government by law.”259  Indeed, it is particu-
larly  difficult  to  envision how U.S.-style  litigation, with  its  emphasis  on 
broad discovery, open and vociferous airing of arguments, and definitive 
rulings based on “objective” evidence and reference to uniformly applied 
abstract legal principles,  could effectively be implemented in a society in 
which individuals by and large do not believe that ultimate truth can be ar-
ticulated in words, have difficulty airing interpersonal conflict openly, and 
find insistence upon logical consistency to be a sign of emotional immatur-
ity.  
Indeed, if there is a legitimate criticism of Western postmodernism, it is 
that in its wholesale rejection of the Enlightenment tradition, it can some-
times display a naiveté towards how non-Western cultures actually func-
tion,  perhaps most  clearly  exemplified by the unmitigated adoration ex-
pressed by Michel Foucault towards the 1979 Iranian revolution.  In a meet-
ing with Iranian writer Baqir Parham in Iran in 1978, Foucault denounced 
capitalism as “the harshest, most savage, most selfish, most dishonest, op-
pressive society one could possibly imagine,” and told Parham that revolu-
tionary religious movements could provide a new point of departure for 
Western thought and that he “hoped to take back to Europe something from 
the revolutionary movement of Iran.”260  His enthusiasm for the Iranian re-
volution continued even after the anonymous Iranian feminist “Atoussa H.” 
warned the West about the realities of rule by Islamic law,261 and he refused 
to respond to rebuttals in the French press that started appearing around 
258 See generally John K. M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and Develop-
ment Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. Pa. J. Int’l. Econ L. 219 (2007).  
Ohnesorge criticizes the “Washington Consensus” that he associates with “rule of law or-
thodoxy” and “the energetic neoliberalism of the 1990s.”  Id. at 243. This orthodoxy posits 
that “[w]ithout the protection of human and property rights, and a comprehensive frame-
work of laws, no equitable development is possible.  A government must ensure that it has 
an effective  system of  property,  contract,  labor,  bankruptcy,  commercial  codes,  personal 
rights laws and other elements of a comprehensive legal system that is effectively, impar-
tially and cleanly administered by a well-functioning, impartial and honest judicial and leg-
al system.”  Id. at 256 (quoting James D. Wolfensohn, A Proposal for a Comprehensive De-
velopment Framework (January 21, 1999).  
259 Chan Wing-Tsit, 22.  
260 Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the 
Seductions of Islamism 75-76 (2005).  The quote about capitalism is a direct quote from 
“Dialogue between Michel Foucault and Baqir Parham,” conducted in September 1978 and 
originally published in Nameh-yi Kanun-I Nevisandegan (Publication of the Center of Ira-
nian Writers), no. 1 (Spring 1979): 9-17, translated and reproduced in Afary and Anderson, 
Appendix, pp. 183-194. 
261 Quoted in Afary and Anderson.  
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March 1979, which highlighted the new regime’s executions of homosexual 
men and compulsory veiling of women.262  Jürgen Habermas has criticized 
Foucault’s disregard for the importance of Enlightenment thinking to the es-
tablishment of democratic and constitutional rule, and Afary and Anderson 
point out that, while Foucault was willing to “exoticize[] and admire[] the 
East from afar,” he preferred to remain a Westerner in his own life.263  
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL PRIVACY STANDARDS
The mystery of why APEC promulgated comparatively “weak” standards 
for transborder data protection in 2004 is now quite easily solved: It was 
fully consistent with APEC’s work in other areas, and had little or nothing 
to do with APEC being hijacked by U.S. business interests.  As Shin-yi Peng 
explains,
APEC’s Asian members [China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and 
Singapore] insist that APEC should be defined as a loose, consultative for-
um, not as a treaty-based organization, and that APEC should be character-
ized by a spirit of pragmatism.  Asian members do not like the idea of set -
ting up any regional bureaucratic or judicial institutions with powers of reg-
ulation or enforcement over individual APEC governments.  They do not 
want to make any formal commitments, because they are pursuing a pro-
cess based on “consensus” and “joint encouragement.”  The paradigm of 
APEC is essentially a mechanism based on voluntary consensus and peer 
pressure.  This kind of “soft” law, consisting of a set of commonly agreed 
skeletal principles stated in broad terms, is the preferred Asian way.  For 
Asians, vague language is often necessary to ensure consensus on sensitive 
issues.  Ambiguity is almost an art form; it is viewed as a useful device in 
mitigating  conflict  and  building  common  positions  and  confidence.  For 
Westerners, in contrast, ambiguity is a weakness—a reflection of weak re-
solve or a feeble mind.  Asians prefer flexibility, which they view as a virtue. 
Westerners, on the other hand, prefer concrete agreements and view ambi-
guity as creating loopholes.  Westerns tend to focus on procedures and re-
gard disputes and negotiations as natural, inevitable, and even productive 
or beneficial.   Asians tend to avoid legalism and emphasize group “har-
262 Afary and Anderson, 6.  
263 Afary and Anderson, 16-17 (citing Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Mod-
ernity: Twelve Lectures 289 (1995)).
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mony” and consensus.  To most Asians, disputes and negotiations disturb 
group harmony.264
Ironically, it is usually the Americans who are most unnerved by the East 
Asian approach to multilateral relations, as they prefer to “start with legally 
binding commitments covering a wide range of issues” rather than agreeing 
on broad principles and then letting things “evolve and grow gradually.”265 
But on privacy issues, it  is  the Europeans who have a problem with the 
APEC model.   The  predominantly  European-led  models  for  transborder 
data protection are generally characterized by a particularly rigid adherence 
to Enlightenment-style legalistic thinking.  Amartya Sen criticizes Rawls’ ap-
proach to justice as being far  too preoccupied with the question of with 
identifying the societal  institutions that  epitomize “perfect” justice  in  an 
ideal society, rather than examining actual behaviors of people within real 
societies  (a  tendency  Sen calls  “transcendental  institutionalism”).266  The 
predominantly European global privacy advocates are more Rawlsian than 
Rawls in their rigidity and preoccupation with form.  The 1995 EU Data Dir-
ective,  often promoted as the global  gold standard,  severely restricts the 
transfer  of  data  outside  the  EU to any country  that  does  not  have “ad-
equate” data protection, and a country’s “adequacy” is measured solely by 
the existence of an omnibus data protection law and the existence of an “in-
dependent” data privacy commissioner.267  The Council of Europe Conven-
tion No. 108 similarly appears to require all parties to the Convention to ad-
opt an omnibus data processing law; an additional Protocol requires an in-
dependent  data  privacy commissioner.268  Such  instruments  rest  entirely 
upon the presumption that more law equals more privacy.  Where there is a 
law governing data processing, there is privacy; where there is no law, there 
is  no  privacy,  or  the  privacy is  not  “adequate.”   Privacy is  typically  de-
264 Shin-yi Peng.
265 Amitav Acharya, Multilateralism: Is There an Asia-Pacific Way? 12-18 (1997).  
266 Amartya Sen, the Idea of Justice 6-8.  
267 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement  of  such  data,  available  online  at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/index_en.htm. 
268 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, ETS No. 108, Strasbourg, 28.I.1981, Article 4; and Additional 
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Pro-
cessing of  Personal  Data  regarding  supervisory  authorities  and transborder  data  flows,  
Strasbourg,8.XI.2001,  ,  Article  1;  both  instruments  are  available 
at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm.  Convention 108 is in the pro-
cess of being formally renegotiated; see http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/datapro-
tection/modernisation_en.asp.
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scribed  in  European  circles  in  absolutist  terms,  often  with  reference  to 
“levels,” certain countries being deemed to have a “lower level” of privacy 
protection than European countries.
The International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commis-
sioners  (ICDPPC),  a  body  consisting  largely  of  privacy  commissioners 
whose offices were created pursuant to EU member states’ obligations un-
der the 1995 EU Data Directive, has a strict membership requirement:  any 
voting member must be “independent” from the rest of the government, 
and must hail  from a state that has data protection laws covering every 
corner of the private sector  has strict and somewhat unclear membership 
standards that the U.S. Federal Trade Commission initially had some diffi-
culty meeting; meanwhile the Commission for Informatics and Freedom for 
Burkina Faso (a nation with a 26% literacy rate)269 has already been accepted 
as a full voting member.270  It is the ICDPPC that now seeks to make its 2009 
joint proposal on “International Standards for the Protection of Privacy and 
Personal Data” into a “universal, binding legal document,” such as an addi-
tional protocol implementing Article 17 of the International Convention on 
Civil  and Political  Rights  (ICCPR).271  Nothing  could be more classically 
Kantian or Rawlsian than the notion that the entire world might one day 
submit to a global  juridical order—except that even Kant recognized the 
dangers  of  Western ethnocentrism and “reject[ed]  all  arrogant  European 
perspectives” that saw Europe as the vanguard of  civilization and looked 
down with contempt upon the non-Western “savages.”272  
East Asian countries would most likely respond to such a proposal in 
one of the following ways.  First, some or all might simply ignore it.  The In-
ternational  Covenant  on Civil  and Political  Rights,  adopted by the  U.N. 
General Assembly in 1966, was signed by China in 1967 but has never been 
269 U.S. Department of State, “Background Notes, Burkina Faso,” February 2010, available on-
line at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2834.htm.  
270 See  http://www.privacyconference2009.org/program/Presentaciones/index-iden-id-
web.html.  
271 http://www.privacyconference2009.org/home/index-iden-idweb.html.  Interestingly,  the 
former United Nations Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin 
Scheinin,  never  recommended the adoption  of  an  additional  protocol,  following his  in-
depth analysis of ICCPR Article 17 and counter-terrorist-related surveillance in his 2009 An-
nual Report.  See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of hu-
man  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  while  countering  terrorism,  Martin  Scheinin, 
A/HRC/13/37, 28 December 2009. 
272 Otfried Höffe, Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace, 16-17 (Alexandra Newton, 
trans., 2006).  
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ratified.273   Second, they might sign a multilateral treaty but treat its legal 
obligations with the same respect and sanctity that many East Asians extend 
to private contracts (i.e., not very much).274  Third, they might sign it fully 
intending to implement its legal obligations but then find themselves un-
able to honor that commitment due to domestic realities.  In the talks lead-
ing up to China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002, 
in which China agreed to “administer its laws affecting trade an a uniform 
and impartial manner,” former U.S. Undersecretary of Commerce Robert 
Herzstein opined that “it is not likely that the globally oriented and well-in-
tentioned trade officials in Beijing who negotiated these commitments will 
be able to control the protectionist behaviour of countless officials and Com-
munist Party leaders with their own agendas.”275  
Finally, the unique relationship East Asians enjoy with legal institutions 
might lead to the result that they join a global privacy convention and en-
force its provisions a little too well.  The Japanese problem of over-protect-
ing data, described by Orito and Murata, is most likely attributable not to a 
lack of understanding of privacy in Japan, but to an “instinctive abhorrence 
of the very idea of law”276 and a deep desire to avoid entanglement in a leg-
al proceeding at all costs.277  Law, after all, is for criminals and barbarians, 
not Confucian gentlemen.  China has upped the ante in this regard by creat-
ing criminal sanctions for the unlawful disclosure or acquisition  of certain 
kinds of personal data.  In January 2010, a Chinese citizen was sentenced to 
one and a half years in prison for purchasing a detailed log of telephone 
calls made and received by high-ranking local government officials.278 
273 See  United  Nations  Treaty  Collection  web  page  at  http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDe-
tails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en.  
274 Although North Korea in many respects represents an entirely different kettle of fish, it is 
worth pointing out that North Korea ratified the multilateral Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons in 1985 but withdrew from it in 2003, the first nation ever to with-
draw from the treaty.  This followed U.S. allegations that it had started an illegal enriched 
uranium weapons program and the U.S. decision to stop shipping fuel oil pursuant to an 
Agreed Framework that had supposedly resolved plutonium enrichment issues in 1994, fol-
lowing North Korea’s previous threat to withdraw from the non-proliferation treaty in 1993. 
275 Robert Herzstein, Wall Street journal, Nov. 16, 1999a, quoted in Hudson N. Janisch, “Admin-
istrative Process and the Rule of Law,” in China and the Long March to Global Trade: The 
Accession of China to the World Trade Organization 201 (2003).  
276 Hideo Tanaka, the Japanese Legal System 302 (1976).  
277 Orito and Murata describe Japanese firms’ efforts at personal data protection as “a form of 
‘cold feet’ compliance; firms hesitate to do anything that is questionable…Indeed, since [the] 
enforcement [of the APPI) on 1 April 2005, no for 
278 Arthur Dicker, Paul D. McKenzie, Gordon Milner, Data Privacy in China: Civil and Crimin-
al Law Developments, January 2010, available at http://www.mofo.com/tools/print.aspx.  
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Thus, the prospects for a global legal regime governing privacy protec-
tion do not look particularly promising—except that things are never that 
simple. First, it cannot be emphasized enough how malleable, even conta-
gious, individualistic and collectivistic cultural influences can be. Studies in-
dicate that “simple laboratory manipulations of social orientation” can ef-
fectively “prime” either an interdependent, collectivist orientation or an in-
dividualistic orientation (for example, by having the subjects read a para-
graph and circle all first-person plural pronouns (“we, us our”) versus “I, 
me, mine”).279 Some of Kitayama’s studies involving Americans living in Ja-
pan and Japanese living in America show a shift in cognitive processes after 
just a few months, with Americans living in Japan shifting “in a decidedly 
Japanese direction” and vice versa.280  Then there’s the story of the young 
Canadian  psychologist  who  lived  for  several  years  in  Japan.   When  he 
began applying for academic jobs back home, “[h]is advisor was horrified to 
discover that his letter began with apologies about his unworthiness for the 
jobs in question.”281
Moreover,  anthropologists  are  already pushing back against  the strict 
binary construct established by social psychologists like Markus, Kitayama, 
and Nisbett, to the extent Western cultures are deemed “individualistic” or 
“egocentric” and non-Western cultures more “collectivistic.”  A study of the 
Ijo people of southern Nigeria, for example, found “elements of both mod-
els present in the way individuals defined themselves and their social rela-
tionships” and concluded that “the two models are not necessarily exclusive 
nor are they conflicting, but may coexist in the self-definitions and motiva-
tions of individuals within the same society.”282  Certainly, there are collect-
ivistic  sub-cultures within the United States;  chief  among them, the U.S. 
Armed Forces.  Anthropologist Alan Fiske counsels his social psychologist 
colleagues not to equate nations with cultures, or to treat culture as a con-
tinuous quantifiable variable, as a culture has many moving parts, and we 
still  do  not  know  which  components  might  be  causally  determinative 
and/or mutually constitutive of other components.283
279 Nisbett, 228.  
280 Nisbett, 227.  
281 Nisbett, 68.  
282 Marida Hollos and Philip E. Leis, Remodeling Concepts of the Self: An Ijo Example, Ethos 
29(3):371-387, available online at http://www.jstor.org/pss/640629.  
283 Alan Page Fiske, Using Individualism and Collectivism to Compare Cultures—A Critique 
of the Validity and Measurement of the Constructs: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002), 
Psychological Bulletin 2002, Vol. 128, No. 1, 78-88, at 78, 85.  
2013] Lara A. Ballard: The Dao of Privacy 173
Rule of law is also not an either/or proposition, and there are other com-
pelling advocates of global justice besides John Rawls—chief among them 
Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen.  In The Idea of Justice,  Sen advocates 
moving away from Rawls’ preoccupation with what Sen calls “transcend-
ental institutionalism” in favor of “realization-focused comparison.”  Sen ar-
gues that Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, Karl Marx, and 
other 19th and 20th century theorists were, in contrast to Rawls, far more pre-
occupied with “comparisons of societies that already existed or could feas-
ibly emerge, rather than confining their analyses to transcendental searches 
for a perfectly just society.”284  His criticism of Rawlsian “transcendental in-
stitutionalism” is that it “concentrates primarily on getting the institutions 
right, and it is not directly focused on the actual societies that would ulti-
mately  emerge.”285  The  term  “transcendental  institutionalism”  perfectly 
epitomizes the problem with the largely European Union-led drive for glob-
al  homogenization  of  privacy  protections;  the  entire endeavor  seems 
premised on the notion that, if a nation has an omnibus data protection law 
and an “independent” data protection commissioner, then it has good pri-
vacy protection, and if it lacks either of these institutions, then it has poor or 
“inadequate” privacy protection.  There is little or no evaluation of the en-
forcement or enforceability of various legal regimes.  Sen’s exploration of 
“realization-focused comparison” opens the door for  a  more  flexible  ap-
proach to evaluating which nations have real problems providing data pro-
tection, and which ones simply have unique or complex privacy enforce-
ment mechanisms.
There is plenty of law in East Asia, and the number and variety of pri-
vacy laws grow with each passing year,286 as do popular notions of a more 
individualistic  brand of  privacy.   Lü Yao-Huai  notes  that  the  2002 book 
Chinese Concepts of Privacy fails to address “important transformations in 
widely shared Chinese ideas of privacy since the 1980s,” and he argues that 
the  market  economy (in  which  China  is  now  a  quite  enthusiastic  parti-
cipant) “needs the individual as an independent subject.”287 He reports that 
55 percent of Chinese citizens think that privacy should be protected and re-
spected, that the sense of physical personal space is rapidly expanding, and 
that high school students are even insisting upon a greater respect for their  
privacy from their own parents,  something virtually unheard of in tradi-
284 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice 7 (2009).  
285 Sen, 6.  
174 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 7:2
tional Chinese culture.288  He credits “the supra-national and international 
character  of  the  Internet  and  the  WTO”  with  most  of  these  cultural 
changes.289  There is also a growing interest in the emerging field of “in-
formation ethics,” in which some of the most interesting cross-cultural con-
versations about privacy, particularly those involving Japanese scholars, are 
currently playing themselves out.290  
And on the other side of the globe,  Americans are slowly, in fits  and 
starts, coming to the realization that the rule of law doesn’t always have to 
be formalistic, that “objective” fact-finding is to a large degree a fiction, and 
that sometimes judges are affected by their own, phenomenal life experi-
ences and should strive to be “empathetic.”  For every dispute between East 
Asian  countries  that  is  settled  in  the  formalistic  processes  of  the  World 
286 Several of these laws seem loosely modeled after the European model of a single data pro -
cessing law that governs both the public and private sector, enforced by an independent 
data commissioner.  See, e.g., Hong Kong’s Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486), 
available online at http://www.pco.org.hk/english/ordinance/ordfull.html.  Chen Yongxi cri-
ticizes the Hong Kong privacy regime as being too leniently enforced and not providing 
harmed parties with effective remedies.  See Chen Yongxi, “Strengthening personal data 
protection during the construction of electronic government: Reactions and limits of Hong 
Kong privacy laws.” Taiwan has the 1995 Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection 
Law (CPPDPL),  http://www.privacyexchange.org/legal/nat/omin/taiwan.html, which is en-
forced by several different federal agencies.  See  http://www.privacyinternational.org/art-
icle.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-83551.  Japan, as discussed supra, has the APPI.  Japan, like the 
U.S., has a constitution that does not explicitly the right to privacy but implicitly includes  
such a right by virtue of supreme court jurisprudence.  Korea has constitutional provisions 
protecting privacy at home and in correspondence.  See South Korea Constitution, arts. 16-
18, http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ks00000_.html.  Laws implementing this constitution-
al right include the Protection of Personal Information Maintained by Public Agencies (1994, 
amended 2002), the Electronic Transaction Basic Act (1999), the Act on the Promotion of In-
formation and Communications Network Utilization and Data Protection (2000); and the 
Framework  Act  on  Electronic  Signatures  Act.   See 
http://www.bakercyberlawcentre.org/2003/Privacy_Conf/papers/Day2/Chung.doc; 
http://www.bakerinfo.com/apec/koreaapec_main.htm;  http://www.privacyknowledgebase.-
con/document.jsp?docid_REFDPASP#Republic%20of@20Korea;  http://www.ecommerce.or-
.kr/about/ec_policy1.asp.  
287 Lü Yao-Huai, Privacy and data privacy issues in contemporary China, Ethics and Informa-
tion Technology (2005) 7:7-15, at 7.
288 Id., 8, 14.  
289 Id., 9. 
290 In addition to the above cited articles, see also, e.g., Toru Nishigaki, “The ethics in Japanese 
information society: Consideration on Francisco Varela’s The Embodied Mind from the per-
spective of fundamental informatics,” Ethics and Information Technology (2006) 8:237-242. 
Lü Yao-Huai finds that in China, “ethical reflection concerning privacy and the right to pri -
vacy is relatively behind the times” and “lacks academic depth,” although he does cite a few 
Chinese language articles as exploring such issues. Lü Yao-Huai, at 11 (citing R.-Z. Liu and 
D.  Wei,  The  ethical  and  legal  standardization  to  gene  privacy,  Studies  in  Dialectics  of 
Nature, 9:77-81, 2004; Y.-F. Yu, On the ethics of protection of right to privacy in networks, 
Guangxi Social Sciences, 7:52-53, 2004; R.F. Li and Y. Na., A Philosophical reflection on the 
loss of privacy.  Science, Technology and Dialectics, 5: 38-41, 2003).  See also Guoliang GU, 
The Best Protection for Personal Information—Legitimate and Effective Use. 
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Trade Organization (and the number grows every year),291 there are West-
erners turning to mediation and other forms of alternative dispute resolu-
tion, that seek not so much an objective determination of who is right and 
who is wrong as simply a means of restoring harmonious interpersonal re-
lations.292 The last few centuries might have been characterized by Western 
cultural imperialism, but it appears that as Western civilization and its leg-
alistic  nation-state  has  confidently  stamped  its  mark  on  the  rest  of  the 
world, Daoism has all the while been quietly seeping in through its founda-
tion, softening it from within. 
7. CONCLUSION
Global privacy standards are not dead in the water, but their proponents 
could stand to take a few cues from Daoism and hew more closely to the 
principle  of  wu wei,  of  not  forcing.   The  Huang He,  or  Yellow River,  is 
known as “China’s Sorrow,” for its tendency to both flood and drastically 
change course, with often devastating human consequences.  But it is also 
called “the Mother River” and “the cradle of Chinese civilization,” because 
harnessing its power required very early social organization on a massive 
scale.293  While this consolidation of political power in the supreme ruler led 
to the brutal regimentation of the Ch’in and many other instances of despot-
ism, it also positioned China as the primary source of political and cultural 
influence in East Asia for thousands of years to come.  It is small wonder, 
then, that Laozi and the other great classic philosophers, in their attempts to 
explain the Dao, would become so seized with water and its paradoxical 
properties.  
291 Shin-yi Peng (“Although the United States is still the most frequent user of the system, and 
the contrast is still relatively sharp, the statistics are encouraging…[S]ome countries, such as 
Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, which have never invoked the GATT’s dispute 
settlement procedure, began to bring cases to the WTO .  The WTO experience to date re-
veals progress in East Asia’s ability and willingess to cope with the trend toward legalism.”)
292 See also generally Mark C. Modak-Turan, A Process Theory of Natural Law and the Rule of 
Law in China, 26 Penn St. Int’l. L. Rev 607 (2008)(incorporating Whitehead’s process philo-
sophy into a proposal for “a constructive, post-modern normative theory of law”).  See, e.g., 
Mark Kleiman, A Perspective on the Growth and Evolution of the Field of Mediation, Medi-
ate.com, July 2006, available at https://www.mediate.com/articles/kleimanM1.cfm. 
293 Ping-ti Ho, The Cradle of the East 12 (1975).  As Steward notes, larger rivers must be diver-
ted far upstream of the fields in need of irrigation, requiring heavy labor and a form of 
political organization capable of exercising control over a large geographic area.  Such elab-
orate forms of organization are typical of both ancient China and the Indus Valley, and ten-
ded to emerge much later in regions like Southeast Asia, where the smaller rivers and tribu-
taries were more easily dealt with by local townships and organizations.  Julian H. Steward, 
“Some Implications of the Symposium,” in Irrigation Civilizations: A Comparative Study 73 
(Steward, ed., 1955).   
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It is also no surprise that the proponents of global privacy standards feel 
similarly engulfed by the transborder flows of data, and find themselves 
clamoring for a massive global governing structure that is capable of pro-
tecting  humanity  from  the  floods  and  changes  in  course  that  they  feel 
threaten our very existence.  But to do so will require flexibility, and more 
importantly, humility.  Before creating a legalistic  structure with uniform 
standards, they would do well to recall what the short-lived Ch’in Dynasty 
learned from following followed the draconian advice of Lord Shang and 
Han Fei Tzu—the harder the Emperor squeezed, the more that political con-
trol simply slipped between his fingers. Heraclitus warned us that we can 
never step into the same river twice, but the efforts thus far to control the 
use of rapidly changing technologies appear to be nothing so much as a 
series of massive dams erected at each national border, as if the flows of 
data have any inclination to stop at a passport control station, as if  these 
flows won’t  simply be redirected elsewhere.   If  global  privacy advocates 
wish to chase personal data down each of its tiny tributaries, across count-
less governments and cultures, they need to be much more clever, and dis-
play far more creativity than I can even offer in this Article.  For I myself, at  
the end of this journey into the Dao, am both humbled and dubious that the 
key to protecting and cultivating the true Subjective Self could ever be artic-
